

PCR EVALUATION NOTE FOR PUBLIC SECTOR OPERATIONS

1. BASIC INFORMATION

a. Basic project data

Project title: Economic Recovery Emergency Programme (PURE)

Project code: P-MG-K00-010 Instrument number(s): 5900150000151

Project type: Crisis response budget support Sector: Multi-sector governance

Country: Madagascar Environmental categorization (1-3) : 3

Processing Milestones	Key Events	Disbursement and Closing date
Date approved: 5 Nove 2014	Cancelled amount: N/A	Original disbursement deadline: 29 Jan 2015
Date signed: 5 Nov 2014	Supplementary financing: N/A	Original closing date: 30 Jun 2015
Date of entry into force : 16 Jan 2015	Restructuring: N/A	Revised disbursement deadline: N/A
Date effective for 1st disbursement: 29 Jan 2015	Extensions (specify dates): N/A	Revised closing date: N/A
Date of actual 1st : 29 Jan 2015		

b. Financing sources

Financing source/ instrument (MUA)	Approved amount (MUA) :	Disbursed amount (MUA) :	Percentage disbursed (%) :
Loan:	25,000,000	25,000,000	100%
Grant:			
Government:			
Other (ex. Co-financiers):			
TOTAL :	25,000,000	25,000,000	100%

Co-financiers and other external partners: N7A

Execution and implementation agencies: Ministry of Finance and Budget (MFB)

c. Responsible Bank staff

Position	At approval	At completion
Regional Director	Marlène Kanga	Marlène Kanga
Sector Director	Lobe Ndoumbe	Jacob Mukete
Sector Manager	Jacob Mukete (OSGE.2)	Milfrid Abiola, OIC (OSGE.2)
Task Manager	Leandre Bassole (OSGE.2)	Leandre Bassole

		(OSGE.2)
Alternate Task Manager		Angélique Umubyeyi (OSGE.2)
PCR Team Leader		Angélique Umubyeyi (OSGE.2)
PCR Team Members		Leandre Bassole (OSGE.2), Angélique Umubyeyi (OSGE.2)
d. Report data		
PCR Date : 30 Oct 2015		
PCR Mission Date:	From: 15 Sep 2015	To: 15 Sep 2015
PCR-EN Date: 27 Jun 2018		
Evaluator/consultant : Lena Westlund	Peer Reviewer: Pegatienan Hiey	

2. PROJECT DESCRIPTION

Summary from Appraisal Report including addendum/corrigendum or loan agreement, and taking into account any modification that occurred during the implementation phase.

a. Rationale and expected impacts:

In 2014, Madagascar was emerging from a five-year long (2009-2013) political crisis that had weakened political and economic institutions and led to a general deterioration of the living conditions of the country's population. The crisis seriously eroded the State's capacity to provide basic essential services to the population: (i) many healthcare centres were closed (about 241 in 2010); (ii) the number of children out of school increased by more than 600,000; and (iii) acute malnutrition among children increased in some areas by over 50%. Productive public investment dropped sharply during the crisis. Real GDP growth fell to -3.5% in 2009 before picking up again to 1.6% on average over the 2010-2013 period, thus reflecting the adverse effects of the crisis. To address this emergency, and following political normalisation, the IMF in June 2014 approved emergency financial assistance under the Rapid Credit Facility arrangement intended not only to pave the way for complementary support, but primarily to ensure a gradual return of order in financial and budgetary management. At the social level, PURE was the response provided by the Bank, in agreement with and the supplementary support of development partners, to shore up the efforts of the new Malagasy authorities in addressing the crucial and urgent social and economic needs resulting from the political crisis.

The programme was based on two mutually reinforcing components, namely: (I) strengthening budgetary management; and (II) supporting the promotion of economic recovery. The rationale was that the creation of fiscal space will, in the short and medium term, generate additional domestic resources required not only to finance major public investment projects in all sectors, but also to help restore public delivery of health and education services, as well as stimulate the private sector through payment of domestic arrears owed by the State. Thus, supporting the private sector will restore investor confidence in the State which will, in turn, lead to the expansion of production activities and therefore to greater employment opportunities and more substantial public procurement spurred by productive public investment programmes. This will help to create

national wealth, thereby having a positive impact on domestic revenue thanks to the potential broadening of the tax base.

b. Objectives/Expected Outcomes:

PURE's development objective was to help restore the State's capacity to provide, as a matter of priority, basic social services and create conditions for sustainable growth likely to allow Madagascar to gradually exit from the fragile situation in which it finds itself as a result of the political crisis. PURE also had the following specific objectives: (i) enhance public resource mobilisation; (ii) improve the quality of public spending through efficient re-allocation of resources to meet the urgent needs of priority social sectors; (iii) support public investment programmes; and (iv) stimulate the private sector. The programme was based on two mutually reinforcing components, namely: (I) strengthening budgetary management; and (II) supporting the promotion of economic recovery.

The PURE impact indicators and targets were:

- 1. The fiscal space necessary for economic recovery is created:**
 - Domestic resources increase as % of GDP from 9.6% (in 2013) to 10.4% in 2014 and 11% in 2015.**
 - Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) Indicator 15: Improving the score for strengthening of human resources (education, health and nutrition) from 2.3 in 2013 to at least 2.7 in 2014 and 3 in 2015.**
- 2. Productive investments are made to boost economic recovery:**
 - Rate of public investment as % of GDP increase from 2.4% (in 2013) to 6.1% I 2014 and 6.1% in 2015.**

PURE's main beneficiaries were the entire people of Madagascar, who had been severely affected by the adverse impacts of five years of socio-political crisis. The programme, which aimed to create the fiscal space necessary to finance economic recovery, would help not only to stimulate economic growth, but also to meet pressing social needs in terms of education, health and social protection for the most vulnerable segments of the population. Paying domestic arrears and scaling up productive public investments would mainly allow economic operators to avail themselves of business opportunities, thus helping to create national wealth through productive investment and job creation for the benefit of young people and women.

PURE's other indirect beneficiaries were mining and oil companies.

c. Outputs and intended beneficiaries:

The programme logframe in the Appraisal Report had the following expected outputs and targets:

1.1.1. Intensify public resource mobilization:

- Priority action plan for increasing domestic resources developed, adopted in the Council of Ministers, and implemented in 2014**

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- **Plan for the phased elimination of fuel subsidies and flanking measures over a 12-month period developed, adopted by the Council of Ministers and implemented, causing subsidies to drop to MGA 108 billion in 2014).**

1.1.2. Improve the quality of public expenditure:

- **The social expenditure on education and health to increase by at least 30% and 80% in the 2014 Supplementary Finance Law (SFL), respectively, compared to the Initial Finance Law (IFL) for 2014 (or about 22.4% and 10.8% of the SFL 2014 allocation for education and health, in that order)**

2.1.1. Support public investment programmes:

- **A draft Supplementary Finance Law (SFL) adopted by the Council of Ministers and transmitted to Parliament in 2014 with an increase of at least 40% of the budget allocations for the public investment programme, compared to the IFL 2014 allocations (or about 29% of the budget in the SFL 2014)**
- **A plan for clearing identified domestic arrears (VAT and receivables) is developed and implemented from 2014, thus reducing domestic arrears by 1.5% of GDP (or about MGA 395.9 billion)**

2.1.2. Stimulate the private sector:

- **Extra-budgetary spending arrears for the period between 2010 and 2013 are identified and audited in 2015.**

d. Principal activities/Components:

The emergency operation was structured around two mutually reinforcing components, namely: (i) strengthening budgetary management; and (ii) supporting the promotion of economic recovery:

- **The first component aimed to support the creation of sufficient fiscal space by intensifying public resource mobilisation, on the one hand, and improving the quality of public spending through an efficient and effective reallocation of public resources mainly to basic social sectors, on the other.**
- **The second component focused on support towards the creation of conditions conducive to the recovery of the Malagasy economy through increased State support for productive public investment programmes, and private sector support.**

3. PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT

RELEVANCE

a. Relevance of the project development objective:

The PCR rated the *Relevance of project development objective* as 4 (highly satisfactory). This validation considers 3 (satisfactory) to be a more accurate score.

Overall, and according to the Appraisal Report, the programme was aligned with AfDB and government policy and strategy papers:

- AfDB Interim Country Strategy Paper [I-CSP] 2014-2016: Pillar I "Strengthening Governance to Consolidate the State," specifically to the attainment of the two thrusts: "Strengthening Management" and "Stimulating Private Investment".
- AfDB Ten-Year Strategy 2013-2022.
- Governance Strategic Framework and Action Plan for 2014-2018 (GAP II): Two of the three pillars - public management and improvement of the business climate.
- Bank's Private Sector Development Policy for 2013- 2017, particularly Pillar I on business climate improvement, since it aimed to clear domestic arrears owed by the State and create a climate of trust for investors.
- AfDB new strategy for countries in transitional situation entitled: "Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa (2014-2019)": first priority thrust ("Strengthening State Capacity and Supporting Effective Institutions").

This evaluation finds though that this alignment could perhaps have been somewhat more explicit with regard to specific dimensions of the relevant policies and strategies and better integrated with other reform needs, e.g., institutional capacity building. It would also appear that attention would have been needed to address underlying constraints with regard to weak governance (*see also below on design*).

b. Relevance of project design (from approval to completion):

The PCR gave *Relevance of project design* a score of 3 (satisfactory). This evaluation confirms this rating noting the following:

Budget support operations, such as PURE, are potentially important instruments for reform. To implement the appropriate reforms also requires institutional capacity and the PURE was supported by the Institutional Governance Support Project (PAGI) and the Investment Promotion Support Project (PAPI). There could though perhaps have been closer links with other interventions and support (by the AfDB and other partners). The memorandum (dated 15 May 2017) on the 2014-2016 I-CSP Completion Report noted that there is a 'need to place budget support operations within a broader reform oriented programme-based approach to support the country's competitiveness' (page 17).

EFFECTIVENESS

c. Effectiveness in delivering outputs:

The PCR gave *Effectiveness in delivering outputs* the score 3 (satisfactory) and this evaluation concurs with this rating. The PCR gave a clear account of the achievements with regard to output indicators / targets and most of the targets were achieved.

d. Effectiveness in delivering outcomes:

The PCR did not provide a score for *Effectiveness in delivering outcomes* but gave a clear account of the achievements with regard to outcome indicators / targets. However, none of the targets were fully achieved and this evaluation gives the rating 2 (unsatisfactory). It appears though that efforts by the government continued after programme's official closure date.

e. Project development outcome:

The PCR scored *Project development outcome* of 3 (satisfactory) but this evaluation would have preferred more information on how outcomes were achieved. The rating of 2 for the PDO emerges due to the 2 rating for outcomes.

While the outcome indicator targets were not achieved at programme closure, the programme outputs and the apparent continued efforts by the government after the programme closure would indicate that the programme contributed to the development objective. More post-programme information would however be needed to assess the impact and this information was not available to this evaluation.

f. Beneficiaries:

The PCR did not score *Beneficiaries* and this evaluation does not have enough information to provide an assessment. The programme beneficiaries are described in very broad terms in the Appraisal Report - entire private sector and population in general - and no impact analysis appears to have been done.

g. Unanticipated additional outcomes (positive or negative, not taken into consideration in the project logical framework):

The PCR did not report any *Unanticipated additional outcomes* and this evaluation did not either identify anything to report in this respect.

EFFICIENCY

h. Timeliness:

The PCR scored *Timeliness* as a 4 (highly satisfactory) but this evaluation finds 3 (satisfactory) to be a more appropriate rating. Approval and disbursement processes were quick and timely. However, it appears that the implementation timeframe was too short to achieve the expected

results.

i. Resource use efficiency:

No rating provided in the PCR and not enough information is available to this evaluation to assess *Resource use efficiency*.

j. Cost-benefit analysis:

No cost-benefit analysis was conducted at appraisal.

k. Implementation progress:

The PCR gave *Implementation progress* the score 3 (satisfactory) and this evaluation agrees with this score.

PURE was a budgetary support intervention and the end-of-programme IPR (attached to the PCR) hence noted N/A on several of the components of implementation progress but gave satisfactory ratings on others, i.e., no problems were identified. M&E was apparently ensured by MFB. The AfDB conducted one supervisory mission and an audit was done with satisfactory results (but the reports were not available to this evaluation).

SUSTAINABILITY

l. Financial sustainability:

The PCR scored *Financial sustainability* 3 (satisfactory) but this evaluation only has the PCR comments and a few general remarks in the memorandum (dated 15 May 2017) on the 2014-2016 I-CSP Completion Report as information to assess sustainability and this is not considered sufficient to assess the financial sustainability.

m. Institutional sustainability and strengthening of capacities:

The PCR gave *Institutional sustainability and strengthening of capacities* a score of 3 (satisfactory) and this evaluation concurs with this rating.

While the PCR stated that ‘PURE contributed to the building of capacity of the structures that had to prepare new strategies and action plans to be implemented to improve their objectives’, there are other indications (e.g., in the memorandum, dated 15 May 2017, on the 2014-2016 I-CSP Completion Report) that the programme was not including sufficient institutional capacity development support. Still, considering the support also from other parallel projects – PAGO and PAPI – strengthening of institutional capacity was addressed overall.

n. Ownership and sustainability of partnerships:

The PCR rated *Ownership and sustainability of partnerships* 3 (satisfactory) and this evaluation sees no reason to disagree with this score.

According to the PCR, the PURE's design was participatory; the design team consulted widely with development partners, Malagasy authorities, civil society and other stakeholders. Moreover, the programme was defined in consultation with other development partners within the framework of the "Budget Support/Public Finance Partnership" group and supported reforms were in line with the General State Programme (GSP).

o. Environmental and social sustainability:

The PCR noted that PURE, as a budget support operation, was classified in category 3 and was hence not expected to have any impact on the physical environment. The PCR also considered that the programme impacted positively on the social environment, through improved budget execution, which is an effective instrument for the achievement of national objectives in terms of poverty reduction and improvement of the living conditions of the population.

This evaluation finds these statements rather general but does not have any further information to make an assessment (UTS).

4. PERFORMANCE OF STAKEHOLDERS

a. Bank performance:

The PCR gave *Bank performance* a score of 4 (highly satisfactory) and this evaluation agrees with this rating, noting the following:

- The Bank's Field Office in Madagascar played an active role in aid coordination in the country.
- According to the PCR (AfDB's comments), lessons learnt were discussed with stakeholders to improve subsequent interventions after supervision and the completion mission.
- The PURE was disbursed in a single tranche and timely.

Still, it should also be noted that the memorandum (dated 15 May 2017) on the 2014-2016 I-CSP Completion Report noted the need to create better synergies between budgetary support operations (such as PURE) and AfDB investment projects.

b. Borrower performance:

The PCR gave *Borrower performance* a score of 3 (satisfactory) and this evaluation concurs with this rating noting the following:

- According to the PCR, there were gaps between the projections and achievements but the government committed to continue its efforts after project closure.
- Conditions for disbursement for fulfilled in a timely manner.

c. Performance of other stakeholders:

The PCR gave *Performance of other stakeholders* a score of 3 (satisfactory) and this evaluation agrees with this rating noting that, according to the PCR, dialogues with partners (IMF, World Bank, EU and the French Development Agency – AFD) were ‘satisfactory considering the complementarity of supported reforms’. At the same time, the memorandum (dated 15 May 2017) on the 2014-2016 I-CSP Completion Report noted weaknesses at the aid coordination level the need to strengthen linkages between investment and reform support (budget support and institutional support) and that the Bank could position itself more effectively.

5. SUMMARY OF OVERALL PROJECT PERFORMANCE

a. Overall assessment:

The PCR scored the relevance of the PURE as 4 (objective) and 3 (design). This evaluation gives a lower rating in for objective: 3 (satisfactory) but confirms the rating of the design. The PCR did not score all dimensions of the effectiveness of the programme but gave delivery of both outputs and development objective a score of 3 (satisfactory). This evaluation agrees with the rating for outputs and scores the effectiveness of delivering outcomes 2 (unsatisfactory) as none of the outcome targets was fully achieved. With regard to the development objective, this evaluation would have liked more post-programme information on impact for its assessment and refrains from giving a score (UTS). The beneficiaries of the programme are very loosely defined – including whole population and all of the private sector – and this evaluation, while recognising the general nature of budgetary support, would have liked to see a stronger effort to define beneficiaries and a gender disaggregated impact analysis. Regarding programme efficiency, the PCR gave timelines a 4 (highly satisfactory) while this evaluation considers 3 (satisfactory) more appropriate as the programme timeframe was very short to generate and follow up on results. It is however recognised that the approval and disbursement processes were quick and timely. With regard to implementation progress, this evaluation agrees with the PCR score of 3 (satisfactory). Resource efficiency and cost-benefit analysis are not scored by neither the PCR nor this evaluation. The PCR considered the sustainability of the programme to be satisfactory (3) for all dimensions except environmental and social sustainability, which was considered not applicable to the programme. This evaluation does not score financial sustainability and the environmental and social sustainability because of lack of information but does find the latter dimension relevant to the programme.

In summary, this evaluation agrees with the PCR overall project rating of 3 (satisfactory).

b. Design, implementation and utilization of the M&E (appreciation of the evaluator):

The programme documentation does not include any clear reference to an M&E system. According to the PCR, the MFB ensured data collection and monitoring-evaluation coordination. The Bank led a supervision mission to assess the progress made, based on reforms agreed on in the logical framework and the reform matrix. There was continuous dialogue on reforms with the support of the AfDB Madagascar Field Office (MGFO). The logframe includes some indicators

and targets, but no gender disaggregation. This evaluation does not have access to sufficient information to assess programme M&E.

6. EVALUATION OF KEY LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Lessons learned:

- 1. Budget support operations in Fragile States: NOT VALIDATED – MOVED TO RECOMMENDATIONS**
- 2. Outcome indicators must be more rational: VALIDATED**
- 3. Strengthen the capacities of the monitoring and evaluation: VALIDATED**

b. Recommendations:

The PCR provided two recommendations to the programme team and the government:

- 1. Reform sustainability depends on reform ownership by government: VALIDATED**
- 2. To achieve the results targeted by the programme, the budget support operation should be conducted simultaneously with institutional support projects: VALIDATED**

ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATION BASED ON LESSONS LEARNT:

- Budget support operations in Fragile States must serve as important instruments of dialogue with authorities to dynamically direct the reforms undertaken in the areas considered as a priority for poverty reduction and the creation of strong and inclusive growth.**

7. COMMENTS ON PCR QUALITY AND TIMELINESS

Overall, the PCR quality is considered to be good (3). In particular considering the nature of the programme – a short budgetary support intervention – the PCR does a good job at providing analyses and information, with well written justifications for ratings. There is apparent objectivity, clearly indicating targets that were not achieved. The PCR is generally well and clearly written. However, the lessons learnt summarised at the end of the PCR document are different from the ones under each section. The PCR is dated 30 October 2015 which is within months after programme closure date of 30 June 2015.

8. SUMMARY OF THE EVALUATION

Criteria	PCR	PCREN	Reason for disagreement/ Comments
RELEVANCE	3.5	3	
Relevance of project development objective	4	3	Could there have been better alignment with specific strategic priorities?
Relevance of project design	3	3	
EFFECTIVENESS	3	2	
Development objective (DO)	3	2	Lack of impact analysis.
EFFICIENCY	4	3	
Timeliness	4	3	Too short an intervention, but quick approval and disbursement.
Resource use efficiency	N/A	UTS	Not enough information to assess.
Cost-benefit analysis	N/A	N/A	
Implementation progress (IP)	3	3	
SUSTAINABILITY	3	2	
Financial sustainability	3	UTS	Not enough information to assess.
Institutional sustainability and strengthening of capacities	3	3	
Environmental and social sustainability	N/A	UTS	Not enough information to assess.
OVERALL PROJECT COMPLETION RATING	4	3	
Bank performance:	4	4	Could there have been better integration and synergies with other AfDB and partner support projects?
Borrower performance:	3	3	
Performance of other shareholders:	3	3	
Overall PCR quality:		3	

9. PRIORITY FOR FUTURE EVALUATIVE WORK: PROJECT FOR PERFORMANCE EVALUATION REPORT, IMPACT EVALUATION, COUNTRY/SECTOR REVIEWS OR THEMATIC EVALUATION STUDIES:

- Project is part of a series and suitable for cluster evaluation
- Project is a success story
- High priority for impact evaluation

It would be interesting and useful to investigate how this budgetary support programme reached poorer population segments, and men and women, respectively. Because of the nature of budgetary support, this is not an easy task but it would appear to be an important aspect for an evaluation to inform future interventions.

- Performance evaluation is required to sector/country review
- High priority for thematic or special evaluation studies (Country)
- PPER is required because of incomplete validation rating

Major areas of focus for future evaluation work:

- a) Performance evaluation is required for sector/ country review
- b) Cluster evaluation (institutional support)
- c) Sector evaluation (budgetary support or public finance management reforms)

Follow up action by IDEV:

Identify same cluster or sector operations; organize appropriate work or consultation mission to facilitate a), b) and/or c).

Division Manager clearance

Director signing off

Data source for validation:

- Task Manager/ Responsible bank staff interviewed/contacted (in person, by telephone or email)
- Documents/ Database reports

Attachment:

- PCR evaluation note validation sheet of performance ratings
- List of references

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT EVALUATION NOTE

Validation of PCR performance ratings

PCR rating scale:

Score	Description
4	Very Good – Fully achieved with no shortcomings
3	Good – Mostly achieved despite a few shortcomings
2	Fair – Partially achieved. Shortcomings and achievements are roughly balanced
1	Poor – very limited achievement with extensive shortcomings
UTS	Unable to score/rate
NA	Non Applicable

Criteria	Sub-criteria	PCR work score	IDEV review	Reasons for deviation/comments
RELEVANCE	Relevance of the project development objective (DO) during implementation	4	3	<p>Overall, and according to the Appraisal Report, the programme was aligned with AfDB and government policy and strategy papers:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AfDB Interim Country Strategy Paper [I-CSP] 2014-2016: Pillar I "Strengthening Governance to Consolidate the State," specifically to the attainment of the two thrusts: "Strengthening Management" and "Stimulating Private Investment". • AfDB Ten-Year Strategy 2013-2022. • Governance Strategic Framework and Action Plan for 2014-2018 (GAP II): Two of the three pillars - public management and improvement of the business climate. • Bank's Private Sector Development Policy for 2013- 2017, particularly Pillar I on business climate improvement, since it aimed to clear domestic arrears owed by the State and create a climate of trust for investors. • AfDB new strategy for countries in transitional situation entitled: "Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa (2014-2019)": first priority thrust ("Strengthening State Capacity and Supporting Effective Institutions"). <p>This evaluation finds though that this alignment could perhaps have been somewhat more explicit with regard to specific dimensions of the relevant policies and strategies and better integrated with other reform needs but recognises at the same time that the type of budgetary support PURE represented</p>

Criteria	Sub-criteria	PCR work score	IDEV review	Reasons for deviation/comments
				is often of a more general character (<i>see also below on design</i>).
	Relevance of project design (from approval to completion)	3	3	Budget support operations, such as PURE, are potentially important instruments for reform. To implement the appropriate reforms also requires institutional capacity and the PURE was supported by the Institutional Governance Support Project (PAGI) and the Investment Promotion Support Project (PAPI). There could though perhaps have been closer links with other interventions and support (by the AfDB and other partners). The memorandum (dated 15 May 2017) on the 2014-2016 I-CSP Completion Report noted that there is a 'need to place budget support operations within a broader reform oriented programme-based approach to support the country's competitiveness'.
OVERALL RELEVANCE SCORE		3.5	3	
EFFECTIVENESS*	Effectiveness in delivering outcomes			
	Outcomes	3	2	The PCR gave a clear account of the achievements with regard to outcome indicators / targets. However, none of the targets were fully achieved. It appears thought that efforts by the government continued after programme's official closure date.
	Effectiveness in delivering output			
	Outputs	3	3	The PCR gave a clear account of the achievements with regard to output indicators / targets and most of the targets were achieved.
	Development objective (DO)			
	Development objective rating	3	2	While the outcome indicator targets were not achieved at programme closure, the programme outputs and the apparent continued efforts by the government after the programme closure would indicate that the programme contributed to the development objective. More post-programme information would however be needed to assess the impact and this information was not available to this evaluation.
	Beneficiaries			
	Beneficiaries	Not available	UTS	The programme beneficiaries are described in very broad terms - Appraisal Report - entire private sector and population in general - and no impact analysis appears to have been done.
	Unanticipated outcomes (positive or negative not considered in the project logical framework) and their level of impact on the project (high, moderate, low)			

Criteria	Sub-criteria	PCR work score	IDEV review	Reasons for deviation/comments
	Institutional development			
	Gender			
	Environment & climate change			
	Poverty reduction			
	Private sector development			
	Regional integration			
	Other (specify)			
EFFECTIVENESS OVERALL SCORE		3	2	
EFFICIENCY	Timeliness (based on the initial closing date)	4	3	Approval and disbursement processes were quick and timely. However, it appears that the implementation timeframe was too short to achieve the expected results.
	Resource used efficiency	Not available	UTS	NA – budget support
	Cost-benefit analysis	N/A	N/A	No cost-benefit analysis was conducted at appraisal.
	Implementation progress (from the IPR)	3	3	PURE was a budgetary support intervention and the end-of-programme IPR (attached to the PCR) hence noted N/A on several of the components of implementation progress but gave satisfactory ratings on others, i.e., no problems were identified. M&E was apparently ensured by MFB. The AfDB conducted one supervisory mission and an audit was done with satisfactory results (reports not available to this evaluation).
	Other (specify)			
OVERALL EFFICIENCY SCORE		4	3	
SUSTAINABILITY	Financial sustainability	3	UTS	This evaluation only has the PCR comments and a few general remarks in the memorandum (dated 15 May 2017) on the 2014-2016 I-CSP Completion Report as information to assess sustainability and this is not considered sufficient to assess the financial sustainability.
	Institutional sustainability and strengthening of capacities	3	3	Budget support operations, such as PURE, are potentially important instruments for reform. To implement the appropriate reforms also requires institutional capacity and the PURE was supported by the Institutional Governance Support Project (PAGI) and the Investment Promotion Support Project (PAPI). There could though perhaps have been closer links with other interventions and

Criteria	Sub-criteria	PCR work score	IDEV review	Reasons for deviation/comments
				support (by the AfDB and other partners). The memorandum (dated 15 May 2017) on the 2014-2016 I-CSP Completion Report noted that there is a ‘need to place budget support operations within a broader reform oriented programme-based approach to support the country’s competitiveness’.
	Ownership and sustainability of partnerships	3	3	According to the PCR, the PURE’s design was participatory; the design team consulted widely with development partners, Malagasy authorities, civil society and other stakeholders. Moreover, the programme was defined in consultation with other development partners within the framework of the “Budget Support/Public Finance Partnership” group and supported reforms were in line with the General State Programme (GSP).
	Environmental and social sustainability	N/A	UTS	The PCR noted that PURE, as a budget support operation, was classified in category 3 and was hence not expected to have any impact on the physical environment. The PCR also considered that the programme impacted positively on the social environment, through improved budget execution, which is an effective instrument for the achievement of national objectives in terms of poverty reduction and improvement of the living conditions of the population. This evaluation finds these statements rather general but does not have any further information to make an assessment.

*The rating of the effectiveness component is obtained from the development objective (DO) rating in the latest IPR of the project (see Guidance Note on the IPR).

The ratings for outputs and outcomes are determined based on the project’s progress towards realizing its targets, and the overall development objective of the project (DO) is obtained by combining the ratings obtained for outputs and outcomes following the method defined in the IPR Guidance Note. The following method is applied: Highly satisfactory (4), Satisfactory (3), Unsatisfactory (2) and Highly unsatisfactory (1).

Criteria	Sub-criteria	PCR Work score	IDEV review	Reasons for deviation/comments
BANK PERFORMANCE	Proactive identification and resolution of problems at different stage of the project cycle			The memorandum (dated 15 May 2017) on the 2014-2016 I-CSP Completion Report noted the need to create better synergies between budgetary support operations (such as PURE) and AfDB investment projects.
	Use of previous lessons learned from previous operations during design and implementation			
	Promotion of stakeholder participation to strengthen			The Bank’s Field Office in Madagascar played an active role in aid coordination in

	ownership			the country.
	Enforcement of safeguard and fiduciary requirements			
	Design and implementation of Monitoring & Evaluation system			
	Quality of Bank supervision (mix of skills in supervisory teams, etc)			According to PCR (AfDB's comments), lessons learnt were discussed with stakeholders to improve subsequent interventions after supervision and the completion mission.
	Timeliness of responses to requests			The PURE was disbursed in a single tranche and timely.
OVERALL BANK PERFORMANCE SCORE		4	4	No disaggregated scores were provided on the above in the PCR that instead had an overall narrative
BORROWER PERFORMANCE	Quality of preparation and implementation			According to the PCR, there were gaps between the projections and achievements but the government committed to continue its efforts after programme closure.
	Compliance with covenants, agreements and safeguards			
	Provision of timely counterpart funding			
	Responsiveness to supervision recommendations			
	Measures taken to establish basis for project sustainability			
	Timeliness of preparing requests			Timely fulfillment of conditions for disbursement.
OVERALL BORROWER PERFORMANCE SCORE		3	3	No disaggregated scores were provided on the above in the PCR that instead had an overall narrative
PERFORMANCE OF OTHER STAKEHOLDERS	Timeliness of disbursements by co-financiers			
	Functioning of collaborative agreements			According to the PCR, dialogues with partners (IMF, World Bank, EU and the French Development Agency – AFD) were ‘satisfactory considering the complementarity of supported reforms’. At the same time, the memorandum (dated 15 May 2017) on the 2014-2016 I-CSP Completion Report noted weaknesses at the aid coordination level the need to strengthen linkages between investment and reform support (budget support and institutional support) and that the Bank could position itself more effectively.
	Quality of policy dialogue with co-financiers (for PBOs only)			
	Quality of work by service providers			

	Responsiveness to client demands			
OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF OTHER STAKEHOLDERS		3	3	No disaggregated scores were provided on the above in the PCR that instead had an overall narrative
The overall rating is given: Very Good, Good, Fair and Poor.				
(i) Very Good (HS) : 4 (ii) Good (H) : 3 (iii) Fair (US) : 2 (iv) Poor (HUS): 1				

DESIGN, IMPLEMENTAION AND UTILIZATION OF MONITRING AND EVALUATION (M&E)

Criteria	Sub-criteria	IDEV Score	Comments
M&E DESIGN	M&E system is in place, clear, appropriate and realistic	UTS	The MFB ensured data collection and M&E.
	Monitoring indicators and monitoring plan were duly approved	UTS	
	Existence of disaggregated gender indicator	1	No gender disaggregated indicators.
	Baseline data were available or collected during the design	3	Baselines exist in Appraisal Report logframe.
	Other, specify		
OVERALL M&E DESIGN SCORE			
M&E IMPLEMENTATION	The M&E function is adequately equipped and staffed	UTS	
OVERALL M&E IMPLEMENTATION SCORE			
M&E UTILIZATION	The borrower used the tracking information for decision	UTS	
OVERALL M&E UTILIZATION SCORE			
OVERALL M&E PERFORMANCE SCORE		UTS	

PCR QUALITY EVALUATION

Criteria	PCR-EVN (1-4)	Comments
QUALITY OF PCR		
1. Extent of quality and completeness of the PCR evidence and analysis to substantiate the ratings of the various sections	3	Generally clearly written justifications for ratings.
2. Extent of objectivity of PCR assessment score	4	Apparent objectivity clearly indicating targets that were not achieved.
3. Extent of internal consistency of PCR assessment ratings; inaccuracies; inconsistencies; (in various sections; between text and ratings; consistency of overall rating with individual component ratings)	4	
4. Extent of identification and assessment of key factors (internal and exogenous) and unintended effects (positive or negative) affecting design and implementation	3	
5. Adequacy of treatment of safeguards, fiduciary issues, and alignment and harmonization	UTS	
6. Extent of soundness of data generating and analysis process (including rates of returns) in support of PCR assessment	UTS	
7. Overall adequacy of the accessible evidence (from PCR including annexure and other data provided)	3	.
8. Extent to which lessons learned (and recommendations) are clear and based on the PCR assessment (evidence & analysis)	2	The lessons learnt summarised at the end of the PCR document are different from the ones under each section.
9. Extent of overall clarity and completeness of the PCR	3	
Other (specify)		
PCR QUALITY SCORE	3.14	
PCR compliance with guidelines (PCR/OM ; IDEV)		
1. PCR Timeliness (On time = 4; Late= 1)	4	The programme closure date was 30 June 2015 and the PCR is dated 30 October 2015.
2. Extent of participation of borrower, Co-financiers & field offices in PCR preparation	UTS	
3. Other aspect(s) (specify)		
PCR COMPLIANCE SCORE		
*** rated as Very Good (4), or Good (3), or Fair (2), or Poor (1)		

References

- PURE Appraisal Report, October 2014
- PCR, October 2015
- Memorandum on MADAGASCAR - 2014-2016 INTERIM COUNTRY STRATEGY PAPER (ICSP) COMPLETION REPORT AND 2016 COUNTRY PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE REVIEW, May 2017