

# PCR EVALUATION NOTE FOR PUBLIC SECTOR OPERATIONS

<b>1. BASIC INFORMATION</b>			
<b>a. Basic project data</b>			
Project title: Skills, Employability and Entrepreneurship Programme – SEEP II			
Project code: P-RW-IZO-003	Instrument number(s): ADF loan 2100150031193		
Project type: PBO	Sector: Social		
Country: Rwanda	Environmental categorization (1-3) : 3		
<b>Processing Milestones</b>	<b>Key Events</b>	<b>Disbursement and Closing date</b>	
Date approved: 07 May 2014	Cancelled amount: N/A	Original disbursement deadline: 31/12/15	
Date signed: 07 May 2014	Supplementary financing: N/A	Original closing date: 30/5/16	
Date of entry into force : 11 June 2014	Restructuring: N/A	Revised disbursement deadline: 30/5/16	
Date effective for 1st disbursement: May 2014	Extensions (specify dates): N/A	Revised closing date: N/A	
Date of actual 1 <sup>st</sup> disbursement: 19 June 2014			
<b>b. Financing sources</b>			
<b>Financing source/ instrument (MUA)</b>	<b>Approved amount (MUA) :</b>	<b>Disbursed amount (MUA) :</b>	<b>Percentage disbursed (%) :</b>
Loan:	49	49	100%
Grant:			
Government:			
Other (ex. Co-financiers):			
<b>TOTAL :</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>100%</b>
Co-financiers and other external partners: N/A			
Execution and implementation agencies: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning.			
<b>c. Responsible Bank staff</b>			
<b>Position</b>	<b>At approval</b>	<b>At completion</b>	
Regional Director	Gabriel Negatu, EARC	Gabriel Negatu, EARC	
Sector Director	Agnes Soucat, OSHD	Sunita Pitamber, OSHD	
Sector Manager	Mohamed Youssouf, OSHD 1	Justin Murara, Ag. Manager, OHSD 1	
Task Manager	Mulle Chikoko, Principal Social Protection Specialist, OHSD 1	Mulle Chikoko, Chief Socio-Economist, OSHD 1/RWFO	
Alternate Task Manager			
PCR Team Leader		Mulle Chikoko	
PCR Team Members		Mulle Chikoko, OSHD 1 /RWFO Bernis Byamukama, RWFO Borel Foko, OHSD 1 Innocent Ntabana, Consultant	
<b>d. Report data</b>			
PCR Date : 25 July 2016			
PCR Mission Date:	From: 28 February 2016	To: 10 March 2016	
PCR-EN Date: June 2018			
Evaluator/consultant : IDDRA, Arthur Neiland		Peer Reviewer/: Judith Ofori	

---

## 2. PROJECT DESCRIPTION

Summary from Appraisal Report including addendum/corrigendum or loan agreement, and taking into account any modification that occurred during the implementation phase.

The Skills, Employability and Entrepreneurship Programme (SEEP II) is a 3 year Policy Based Operation (PBO). The overarching goal of SEEP II is to support policy reform efforts of the Government of Rwanda (GoR) to promote inclusive growth and to reduce poverty. The programme cost is UA 49 million to be disbursed in three tranches over three fiscal years (2013/14 to 2015/16) based on disbursement triggers agreed with the GoR. It is intended to plug the budgetary gap in the skills and entrepreneurship sector. The programme will also support better coordination and monitoring of employment promotion interventions at national and local levels.

---

### a. Rationale and expected impacts:

Provide a brief and precise description on the project/programme rationale (concerns/questions raised), expected impacts and the intended beneficiaries (directly or indirectly impacted by the project/programme). Highlight any change that occurred during the execution phase.

The rationale for the programme is threefold: i) the GoR has identified as a key constraint to development the skills gap existing in the labour market between the educational and skills levels of the labour force and the requirements of employers for highly productive labour, ii) the GoR has identified the development of the innovative small-scale private enterprise sector as the key means through which the country can pursue its economic development objectives. The GoR has further identified that difficulties in accessing finance and business development services are key constraints to the growth of this sector, iii) the GoR has identified that shortcomings in the institutional framework underpinning intervention initiatives in the above two areas are key constraints to development, especially weaknesses in coordination between the many different institutions and initiatives involved.

The intended impacts of the programme are a broadening of the private enterprise sector and improvements in productivity and competitiveness necessary to support economic transformation.

The intended direct beneficiaries of the programme are, i) the labour force, especially youth and women, ii) new entrepreneurs, especially youth and women, and iii) private sector companies hiring labour. The indirect beneficiaries will be the families of a newly empowered labour force. The general population of Rwanda will be the long-term, indirect and ultimate beneficiary.

### b. Objectives/Expected Outcomes:

Provide a clear and concise description of the project objectives, expected outcomes, and intended beneficiaries. In so doing, highlight any revision/amendment.

The overarching objective of the programme is to support Rwanda's efforts to promote inclusive growth and poverty reduction. It attempts to do so by focussing on two areas, namely, i) the labour market: development of skills and employability, and ii) private enterprise: encouraging entrepreneurship and business development. In so doing, the programme hopes to assist Rwanda's goal of transforming from a low-productivity agricultural economy to a market led, high-productivity modern urban economy.

The intended outcomes of the programme are, i) increased skills and employability in the labour market, especially focussed on youth and women, and ii) increased and improved entrepreneurship and business development, especially focussed on youth and women. A third important outcome necessary to achieve, sustain and improve the first two outcomes is, iii) development of the institutional framework underpinning the labour market and private enterprise initiatives.

### c. Outputs and intended beneficiaries:

Provide a clear and concise description of the expected outputs and intended beneficiaries. In so doing, highlight any revision/amendment.

---

The intended programme outputs are shown below. They are divided into three components corresponding with the three intended project outcomes outlined above (section b.). Beneficiaries are divided into direct, indirect and tertiary.

Component: Skills and Employability.

Direct beneficiaries: Students / trainees.

Indirect beneficiaries: employers in the private, public and NGO/NFP sectors. Population of Rwanda.

Output 1: Increased private sector participation in building employable skills

Output 2: Increased availability of vocational skills

Component: Entrepreneurship and Business Development.

Direct beneficiaries: New entrepreneurs (especially youth and women)

Indirect beneficiaries: Families of entrepreneurs.

Tertiary beneficiaries: The population of Rwanda.

Output 3: Enhanced competitiveness of MSMEs.

Output 4: Improved access to financial services for MSMEs

Component: Enhanced Coordination.

Direct beneficiaries: Staff of public sector institutions.

Indirect beneficiaries: trainees, entrepreneurs and the private sector.

Tertiary beneficiaries: The population of Rwanda.

Output 5: Improved policy and coordination mechanisms for labour market interventions.

#### d. Principal activities/Components:

Provide a clear and concise description of the principal activities/components. In so doing, highlight any revision/amendment.

As a Policy Based Operation (PBO) at sector level, many of the activities are administrative measures (AMs) aimed at strengthening the institutional capacity of the GoR which underpins its efforts to improve skills training and private sector entrepreneurship. A number of activities are Pre-Beneficiary Measures (PBMs), aimed at improving the provision of TVET education for students and business advice for new entrepreneurs. Finally, a number of measures are of direct benefit (DBMs) and focus on practical actions to bridge the training-employment gap and assist new entrepreneurs at start-up.

Types of activity and principal activities (Outputs) in the programme:

Administrative measures (AMs)

---

Output 3 - Develop legal framework procedure guidelines and action plans for SSCs.  
Output 4 - Get strategy for internships and attachments approved by NCBS NSC.  
Output 5 - Get assessment on Internship Programme validated by RDB.  
Output 8 - Get National Apprenticeship Policy approved by Cabinet.  
Output 11 - Get TVET policy and strategy approved by Cabinet.  
Output 12 - *Submit draft law establishing WDA to Parliament.*  
Output 16 - Complete assessment of local tax-fixing on MSMEs.  
Output 19 - Complete study on women's skills gap and get it validated by the PS.  
Output 20 - Draw up guidelines on seed start-up capital for youth and women.  
Output 21 - Get National Employment Programme validated by NEP NSC.  
Output 22 - Establish and convene PYE steering committee.  
Output 24 - Develop gender-sensitive electronic M&E system.  
Output 25 - Develop district level coordination framework for business development programs and get it approved by the Integrated Development Programme SC.  
Output 26 - Establish a Working Technical Secretariat for the NEP.

#### Pre-Beneficiary measures (PBMs)

Output 1 - Design new TVET curricula (with private sector).  
Output 2 - Establish SSCs.  
Output 13 - Establish and implement certification program for BDAs.  
Output 14 - Train and certify BDAs at levels 1 & 2, especially women.  
Output 15 - Attach BDAs to sectors.  
Output 23 - Establish, and make functional, BDEs at district level.  
Output 27 - Develop a database of youth and women entrepreneurs.

#### Direct-Beneficiary measures (DBMs)

Output 6 - Get private sector enterprises to host TVET trainees.  
Output 7 - Increase number of TVET graduates, especially females.  
Output 9 - Train, certify and provide toolkits to unskilled and semi-skilled people.  
Output 10 - Increase number of TVET trainees in industrial attachments.  
Output 17 - Equip and make operational ICPCs and CPCs.  
Output 18 - Access finance for start-up youth and women MSMEs.

---

### 3. PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT

---

#### RELEVANCE

##### a. Relevance of the project development objective:

Evaluation of the relevance ex-ante and ex-post (including during the implementation phase). The relevance of the project objective (during the evaluation ex-ante and the post-evaluation) in terms of alignment with country's development priorities and strategies, the beneficiary needs (including any changes that may have occurred during the implementation), applicable Bank sector strategies, the Bank country/ regional strategy, and general strategic priorities of the Bank.

**The PCR scores the relevance of the project to its development objectives as 4, 'Highly Satisfactory'. The PCREN-R agrees.**

The programme's development objectives are relevant to Rwanda's strategic 'Vision 2020', to the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS II) - in particular pillar 3 of the EDPRS focussing on productivity and youth

---

---

employment - and to the National Employment Programme (NEP).

The programme's development objectives are relevant to the AfDB's Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for Rwanda - especially pillar 2 which focuses on skills and entrepreneurial development - and builds on the progress already achieved in SEEP I.

**b. Relevance of project design (from approval to completion):**

The evaluator should provide an assessment of the relevance of the project design regardless of the one provided in the PCR. The evaluator will also comment on the PCR conclusion for this section, and will provide an evaluation of the relevance of the project design. The latter assesses the soundness and the timing of eventual adjustments, or technical solutions to ensure the achievement of the intended results (outcomes and outputs), the adequacy of the risk assessment, environmental and social protection measures, as well as the implementation arrangements.

**The PCR scores the relevance of the project design as 4, 'Highly Satisfactory'. The PCREN-R score is 3, 'Satisfactory'.**

The programme is a follow-on intervention designed to support GoR policy reform to provide an enabling environment that promotes inclusive growth and poverty reduction. Partly based on needs assessment, as well as furthering the gains of SEEP I, the programme was designed to consolidate reforms and focus on skills that can be absorbed by the labour market and promote enterprise development, thereby contributing directly to the government agenda of job creation. The programme was also designed to strengthen coordination of employment creation interventions, to enhance impact and avoid duplication.

While many aspects of the programme design are relevant to the programme objectives, the current evaluation raises questions - both *ex-ante* and *ex-post* - on some aspects of the programme design.

Ex-ante, the question is over the extent to which programme interventions are relevant for an objective concerned with entrepreneurship and the growth of the private sector. The extreme free-market view would say that government and development organisations have no role to play in this outside of ensuring stable macro-economic conditions with monetary and fiscal environments favourable to private enterprise, ensuring sufficient country infrastructure and reducing 'red-tape'. Left to operate freely, markets will work for social and economic good as well as for private good. The worry would be that government investment may crowd-out private investment and government initiatives stifle and smother private initiatives. However, a strong aspect of the programme's objective is its focus on *inclusive* economic growth, poverty reduction, and the empowerment of women and the country's youth, all of which are partly, or wholly, social objectives, which interventionists would say an unfettered free market would never achieve.

Ex-post, the question is over the extent to which the particular interventions chosen in the project design are *in practice* relevant to achieving programme objectives. That is, are the chosen programme interventions *viewed by the intended project beneficiaries* as being relevant to their needs, or not. This is not a theoretical question, but one of how the project interventions are, *in practice*, in Rwanda, received and perceived. The key constituencies here then are not the Government or development agencies or public institutions, but private enterprises, new entrepreneurs, students and trainees, youth and women. If these constituencies enthusiastically endorse program interventions, we can judge the interventions 'well designed', and if they show no appetite for - or actively resist programme interventions - we must judge the interventions 'badly designed' – even if they are well-meaning and relevant to programme objectives. There is much evidence in the PCR to support both judgements, depending on the specific interventions in question.

It is the concern of the current evaluation that these constituencies – the intended project beneficiaries – were insufficiently consulted in project design and insufficiently invested as stakeholders in the design and implementation. This will be shown to be a valid concern *if* the reception of the programme interventions by the beneficiaries is less enthusiastic than their implementation by the institutions responsible for them: and *vice versa*. For example, high enrolment on new TVET courses would validate the intervention, while artisan resistance to CPC's would invalidate that intervention. The ultimate arbiter on programme design is democratic.

---

---

## EFFECTIVENESS

**Evaluator's Note: the Outcomes section d., and the Outputs section c., have been reversed in order here so that they appear in the same order as on all other project documentation.**

### d. Effectiveness in delivering outcomes:

Evaluation of the extent to which the project achieved its intended set of outcomes. The evaluator should make an assessment based on the results of the last project Implementation Progress and Results (IPR). The evaluator shall indicate the degree to which project outcomes (intended and unanticipated) as well as reasons for any eventual gap were discussed in the PCR.

**The PCR score for overall effectiveness of Outcomes is 3, 'Satisfactory'. The PCREN-R agrees.**

Outcome 1 - RFL: Share of TVET enrolment as % of upper secondary stream.

1. The figures in the PCR fail to clearly report what happened to Outcome 1 as a result of the project.
  - i) The PCR does not give the figures for enrolment in upper secondary stream. The numbers *implied* by the percentages calculated in the PCR are as follows. Are these correct?

Baseline values:  
TVET no. enrolled: 52,386  
TVET %: 38%  
Upper 2<sup>nd</sup> enrolled *implied*: 137,858

Most recent values:  
TVET no. enrolled: 94,373  
TVET %: 42%  
Upper 2<sup>nd</sup> enrolled *implied*: 224,698
  - ii) In the baseline year, the sexual disaggregation figures are given as M= 37.7% and F=38.3%, Total = 76%. What gender were the remaining 24% of TVET students? The mistake comes from the RLF in the Project Appraisal.
  - iii) Using the PCR methodology for 'Progress towards target' (A/B),  $42 / 50 = 0.84 \times 100 = 84\%$ , not 42% as reported. Interpretation: the output indicator at the end of the project is 84% of target.

2. There is a methodological problem with the PCR form which makes reporting in the PCR misleading. The column does NOT show 'Progress towards target' as a direct result of the project. It shows the end of project value for the outcome indicator as a percentage of the target value for the outcome indicator. However, this percentage (84%, see above) includes 38% which existed at the baseline year i.e. prior to the project. The 38% cannot therefore be attributed to the effect of the project which is currently being evaluated. Thus, the correct methodology to show the 'Progress towards target' as a direct result of the project is as follows:

*Evaluator's Note: This is the same methodology as used for Outcome Reporting in the IPR. The current evaluation does not understand why this is then dropped for the PCR.*

Thus,

$[42 - 38] = 4$  Interpretation: There has been an *increase* in the outcome indicator during ('as a result of') the project of 4 percentage points,

divide this by,

---

---

$[50 - 38] = 12$  Interpretation: The project needs to achieve an increase in the Output Indicator of 12 percentage points if the project is to reach the Outcome Indicator target.

$\times 100 =$  the 'progress towards target' *as a direct result of the project* expressed as a percentage.

Thus,

$4 / 12 = 0.33 \times 100 = 33\%$  Interpretation: the project was 33% successful in moving from the baseline figure to the target figure for the Outcome Indicator.

Note that an important assumption here is that: *all gains in the project indicator during the project period were attributable to the project and not to other autonomous influences.*

3. Speculating that 'the target of 50% (is) likely to be achieved in 2016' is inappropriate for a PCR.
4. The proportion of females in TVET enrolment in 2015 is quoted as being both 42% and 46%. Which is correct?

Outcome 2 - RFL: *% of employers who are satisfied with the TVET graduates.*

1. Again the figures are unclear. The evaluation uses the IPR methodology (see above) again.

Interpretation: The Output Indicator at the end of project is 97% of target. The project was 63% successful in moving from the baseline figure to the target figure for the Outcome Indicator (*assuming all gains in the project indicator during the project period were attributable to the project and not to other autonomous influences*).

2. A 3.4 percentage point gain in employer satisfaction in 4 years is less than 1 percentage point per year. It *seems* a negligible gain in confidence during the programme. The current evaluation wonders how the target figure was set and why a more ambitious target was not thought appropriate.

Outcome 3 - RFL: *% of TVET graduates employed six months after graduation (disaggregated by sex)*

Again the figures are unclear. The evaluation uses the IPR methodology (see above, Outcome 1) again.

Interpretation: The Output Indicator at the end of project is 118% of target (column C4). The project was 170% successful in moving from the baseline figure to the target figure for the Outcome Indicator (column C5) (*assuming all gains in the project indicator during the project period were attributable to the project and not to other autonomous influences*).

1. If people are 'engaged in multiple jobs', they are more likely to be *over-employed* than *under-employed*.
2. The comment about employer satisfaction belongs to Outcome 2, above.
3. The figures disaggregated by sex are not shown.

Outcome 4 - RFL: *Share of independent off-farm employment in total employment.*

Again the figures are unclear. The evaluation uses the IPR methodology (see above, Outcome 1) again.

---

Interpretation: The Output Indicator at the end of project is 86% of target. The project was 11% successful in moving from

---

the baseline figure to the target figure for the Outcome Indicator (*assuming all gains in the project indicator during the project period were attributable to the project and not to other autonomous influences*).

1. Again the figures disaggregated by sex make no sense. Again the problem derives from the RFL in the Project Appraisal. A possible interpretation is as follows:

The male (M) and female (F) percentages must add up to 100% if they are the only two genders.

$$M = 11.6 + F = 8.0 = 19.6 \text{ percentage points} = 100\%$$

Therefore, each percentage point accredited to M and F is worth  $100 / 19.6 = 5.1$  percentage points, giving

$$M = 11.6 \times 5.1 = 59\% \quad \text{and} \quad F = 8.0 \times 5.1 = 41\% \quad \text{and} \quad 59\% + 41\% = 100\%$$

This is a speculative interpretation and the current evaluation cannot say if these are actually the correct disaggregated figures.

2. It is inappropriate for the PCR to speculate that 'this trend is likely to continue' and 'the trend is likely to ...improve'.

Outcome 5 - RFL: *No. of MSME's created annually as start-ups.*

Again the figures are unclear. The evaluation uses the IPR methodology (see above, Outcome 1) again.

Interpretation: The Output Indicator at the end of project is 110% of target. The project was 128% successful in moving from the baseline figure to the target figure for the Outcome Indicator (*assuming all gains in the project indicator during the project period were attributable to the project and not to other autonomous influences*).

Overall Effectiveness of Outcomes - Narrative Assessment:

The PCR score for overall effectiveness of Outcomes is 3, 'Satisfactory'. The PCREN-R agrees.

1. It is inappropriate for the PCR to speculate that 'Increased performance *should be anticipated* when the reforms *have been* implemented' or what '*will happen*' to the employability of TVET graduates *in the future*.
2. Given the confusion in the figures, it is hard to see how the PCR can make any conclusions about programme Outcomes at all. The current evaluation tentatively suggests the following:

Outcome 1: The programme contributed to a 33% gain in the Outcome Indicator, which now stands at 84% of target.

Outcome 2: The programme contributed to a 63% gain in the Outcome Indicator, which now stands at 97% of target.

Outcome 3: The programme contributed to a 170% gain in the Outcome Indicator, which now stands at 118% of target.

Outcome 4: The programme contributed to an 11% gain in the Outcome Indicator, which now stands at 86% of target.

Outcome 5: The programme contributed to a 128% gain in the Outcome Indicator, which now stands at 110% of target.

---

Conclusion: Assuming that the data on which the calculations are based is valid, all 5 Project Outcome Indicators

---

have benefitted from the project and all stand close to or surpass target at the end of the project.

c. Effectiveness in delivering outputs:

**The PCR score for overall effectiveness of Outputs is 3, 'Satisfactory'. The PCREN-R agrees.**

Output 1 - RFL: *No. of TVET curricula designed in collaboration with private sector.*

1. Again the figures are unclear. The evaluation uses the IPR methodology (see above, Outcome 1) again.

Interpretation: The Output Indicator at the end of project is 96% of target. The project was 92% successful in moving from the baseline figure to the target figure for the Outcome Indicator (*assuming all gains in the project indicator during the project period were attributable to the project and not to other autonomous influences*).

2. The PCR makes the point that the quality of the TVET programme *could be* adversely affected by the fact that only 5% of trainers have been trained on the new curricula. This perhaps indicates a failure of 'coordination' in a programme advocating better coordination.

Output 2 - RFL: *No. of sector skills councils (SSCs) established (and operational)*

The evaluation uses the IPR methodology (see above, Outcome 1) again.

Interpretation: The Output Indicator at the end of project is 100% of target (column C4). The project was 100% successful in moving from the baseline figure to the target figure for the Outcome Indicator (column C5) (*assuming all gains in the project indicator during the project period were attributable to the project and not to other autonomous influences*).

1. The apparently good results above are undermined by the admissions that:
  - i) 'However, these SSC's were not fully operational to provide the required guidance', and
  - ii) The private sector is slow to embrace the concept as it does not value the SSCs. This indicates inappropriate project design.

Output 3 - RFL: *Legal framework, procedure guidelines and action plan for SSCs developed.* TRIGGER

Though this legal measure was achieved and triggered a disbursement of funds, see point 2, above, which throws doubt onto the value of SSC's due to lack of interest from the private sector.

Output 4 - RFL: *Strategy to promote private sector provision of professional internship and industrial attachment approved by NCBS National Steering Committee.*

While the strategy was approved, the PCR notes that, 'Increased private (sector) involvement in professional internship is critical in ensuring relevance, applicability and enhancing employability of skills produced by the education system'. It presents no evidence that such private sector involvement is forthcoming.

---

---

Output 5 - RFL: Assessment on Professional Internship Programme completed and validated by RDB senior management. PRIOR ACTION

While this *prior action* was completed, the PCR notes that ‘Private sector involvement remains low. Most private companies were concerned (about) the cost of hosting interns’: the private sector does not support the initiative.

Output 6 - RFL: No. of private sector enterprises hosting TVET trainees (companies and cooperatives).

Again the figures are unclear. The evaluation uses the IPR methodology (see above, Outcome 1) again.

Interpretation: The Output Indicator at the end of project is 154% of target. The project was 282% successful in moving from the baseline figure to the target figure for the Outcome Indicator (*assuming all gains in the project indicator during the project period were attributable to the project and not to other autonomous influences*).

1. While the above result is excellent, the PCR confides that, ‘However, given the size of the private sector which is dominated by micro and small firms and cost, the bulk of the internships are being hosted by public institutions’: many private sector firms view internships as a cost, not a benefit.
2. It is inappropriate for the PCR to speculate that, ‘more private sector (firms) *are expected to host more trainees*’.

Output 7 - RFL: No. of TVET graduates (including TSS, VTC, IPRC) (% female)

Again the figures are unclear. The evaluation uses the IPR methodology (see above, Outcome 1) again.

Interpretation: The Output Indicator at the end of project is 157% of target (column C4). The project was 242% successful in moving from the baseline figure to the target figure for the Outcome Indicator (column C5) (*assuming all gains in the project indicator during the project period were attributable to the project and not to other autonomous influences*).

1. The target for the *number* of female TVET graduates has been exceeded by 35% (30,070 with target of 22,500). However, the *percentage* of female graduates at 43% is still below – yet close to - the target of 50%. As no figure is presented for the number of female graduates in the baseline year, the current evaluation cannot say if the *percentage* of female TVET graduates is rising or falling or remaining stable.

Output 8 - RFL: National Apprenticeship Policy developed and approved by Cabinet. TRIGGER

1. While the Output Indicator was achieved and triggered a disbursement of funds, the PCR notes that, ‘The private sector has been reluctant to provide internships/attachments due to high exposure of equipment being damaged by trainees’: many private sector firms see internships as a cost, not a benefit.
2. The current evaluation also notes that costs for internships fall partly on the trainee. This *seems likely to deter* – not encourage – potential trainees to join the scheme.

Output 9 - RFL: No. of unskilled and semi-skilled people trained, certified, and getting toolkits (disaggregated by sex).

Contrary to what the PCR says, an 86% success rate for providing toolkits *seems* a good result.

---

---

Output 10 - RFL: *No. of TVET trainees enrolled in industrial attachment programs (disaggregated by sex).*

The evaluation uses the IPR methodology (see above, Outcome 1) again.

Interpretation: The Output Indicator at the end of project is 107% of target. The project was 139% successful in moving from the baseline figure to the target figure for the Outcome Indicator (*assuming all gains in the project indicator during the project period were attributable to the project and not to other autonomous influences*).

1. Full disaggregated figures for female participation are not provided. They are also absent in the RLF.

Output 11 - RFL: *TVET Policy and Strategy approved by Cabinet.* TRIGGER

1. The Output Indicator was achieved and triggered a disbursement of funds.
2. It is unnecessary for the PCR to speculate that 'Full implementation of the policy *could* improve the quality of TVET'.

Output 12 - RFL: *Law establishing WDA revised and enacted by Parliament.* TRIGGER

1. The Output Indicator was downgraded to 'submission of draft bill to parliament,' which was achieved. As all funds have been disbursed, this still must have been sufficient to act as a trigger.
2. Again, the PCR speculates that the measures taken '*will* improve the quality of TVET'.

Output 13 - RFL: *Certification Programme for BDA's established and implemented.* TRIGGER

1. The Output Indicator was achieved and triggered a disbursement of funds.
2. The PCR states that 'The programme was *meant* to improve the quality of business advisors and advisory services'.

Output 14 - RFL: *No. of business advisors trained and certified at level 1 and 2 (disaggregated by sex)*

1. 956 BDA's were trained, representing 88% of the Output Indicator target. 40% of them were female. These represent net gains from the project as the RLF states the baseline figure as zero. Both are 'good' results.
  2. However, the PCR notes that further progress was not achieved due to 'a lack of candidates', but doesn't suggest the reason(s) for this lack of candidates. It remains a worrying note which a PPAR might investigate further.
  3. The PCR again speculates that, '*If* the programme *will be* effectively implemented, *it will* increase (the) number of women and youth entrepreneurs accessing finance through SACCOs and other MFIs'. This seems unnecessary, as the PCR then goes on to present strong evidence of effectiveness, '(during 2015) 'BDAs supported 23,674 business proposals of which 19,110 (81%) were financed by various financial institutions'. As the RLF did not make this an Output Indicator and set a target for it, the current evaluation has nothing from the project against which it can evaluate this output. However, it *seems to be* a large number of business proposal and a very high rate of approval and financing. *If so*, it is a very tangible and commendable output of the project, even if an 'unofficial' one.
-

---

Output 15 - RFL: No. of BDSs attached to sectors (umurenge).

1. Again there appears to be some confusion in the figures for Output Indicators 15 and 14. The evaluation uses the IPR methodology (see above, Outcome 1) again.

Interpretation: The Output Indicator at the end of project is 100% of target. The project was 100% successful in moving from the baseline figure to the target figure for the Outcome Indicator (column C5) (*assuming all gains in the project indicator during the project period were attributable to the project and not to other autonomous influences*).

2. The RFL baseline figure for Output 14 is zero, suggesting that there were *no* trained BDAs in the baseline year. However, the RFL baseline figure for Output 15 is 416, suggesting that 416 BDAs were already *in post*, 'attached to sector'. Is it that this 416 were in-post but untrained?
3. Furthermore, 416 is (oddly?) also the number of the 'sectors', to each of which both Output 14 and 15 tell us that two BDAs have been deployed. That means that 832 BDAs have been deployed. This raises the questions, i) if two BDAs per sector was the *de facto* target, why is the training target for BDAs in Output 15 1082, not 832? And ii) if 956 BDAs were trained under the project, why have 124 (956-832) not been given jobs [or if the original 416 BDAs already in post at the start of the project *were already* trained, why have 540 (946 – 416) not been given jobs?].
4. There are undoubtedly clear answers to these questions, but the PCR and RFL do not provide them.
5. Again, the PCR commendably highlights a problem: that the potential entrepreneurs have to pay 30% towards the BDA service and that 'affordability of services remains a challenge for youth'. Again, there is seen to be a direct barrier to the target beneficiaries of the project accessing the provisions of the project. Again this calls into question the suitability of project design.

Output 16 - RFL: Assessment on the impact of local tax fixing and administration on MSMEs.

The PCR notes that the study was not completed at the time of the PCR.

Output 17 - RFL: No. of ICPCs and CPC's equipped and operational.

Again the figures are confused. The evaluation uses the IPR methodology (see above, Outcome 1) again.

The PCR is unclear on how many ICPC's were established under the project: the end value in the table being 9 but the Narrative Assessment quoting 15.

Interpretation: The Output Indicator at the end of project is 75% (or 125%) of target for ICPCs and 30% for CPCs. The project was 70% (or 130%) successful in moving from the baseline figure to the target figure for the Outcome Indicator for ICPC's and 22% successful for CPCs (*assuming all gains in the project indicator during the project period were attributable to the project and not to other autonomous influences*).

1. The PCR is again to be commended for highlighting problems encountered with the ICPCs and CPCs: i) entrepreneurs were concerned about the cost of new equipment, preferring (cheaper) second-hand equipment, ii) private sector participation in CPCs has been low and doubt is expressed over the relevance of the business model to the needs of private sector entrepreneurs, and iii) CPCs face problems attaining market standards for products, especially packaging. All point to deficiencies in project design. All are issues that a full PPAR could explore and that could inform the design of future projects.
-

---

Output 18 - RFL: *No. of start-up MSMEs for youth and women accessed to finance.*

The evaluation uses the IPR methodology (see above, Outcome 1) again.

Interpretation: The Output Indicator at the end of project is 64% of target. The project was 60% successful in moving from the baseline figure to the target figure for the Outcome Indicator (column C5) (*assuming all gains in the project indicator during the project period were attributable to the project and not to other autonomous influences*).

1. Although the RLF and PCR do not provide baseline figures and target figures disaggregated by sex, the disaggregated end of project figure provided by the PCR shows near gender parity (F48:M52) for the Output Indicator. This must be seen as a very encouraging result.
2. The points made by the PCR about the reluctance of private sector FIs to lend to MSME start-ups, underline the importance of public sector and informal credit schemes to finance nascent entrepreneurs in order to promote economic transformation. Public sector and informal credit schemes should thus continue to be a key part of project design in future projects.

Output 19 - RFL: *Study report on women skills gap and existing opportunities in all districts completed and validated by the Permanent Secretary (MIGEPROF).* TRIGGER.

1. The Output Indicator was achieved.
2. The Output Indicator is not listed as a *trigger* in either the RLF or the PCR, but it is in Table 6 of the Appraisal Report.
3. The PCR again correctly highlights the issue of the reluctance of private sector FI's to lend to 'youth and women' (start-up MSMEs), focussing on the borrowers', i) lack of collateral, and ii) 'financial illiteracy'. Again it underlines the importance for public sector and informal credit and advice schemes in on-going project design.

Output 20 - RFL: *Guidelines on provision of seed start-up capital for youth and women developed.*

1. The Output Indicator was achieved.
2. This is an important start, in light of the comments above on Outputs 18 and 19.
3. The current evaluation questions the rationale of restricting access to this start-up capital to only 'qualified' individuals. This is a form of discrimination. (The evaluation notes that Bill Gates and Steve Jobs both dropped out of Harvard without qualifying before going onto found two of the most successful companies the world has ever known.) Access should be solely on the basis of the validity of the business proposal. The BDAs are in post to assist ALL individuals with this task, without discrimination. In the opinion of the current evaluator, discriminating on the basis of education is no different from discriminating on the basis of gender or race. They urge that this restrictive access policy is reviewed.

Output 21 - RFL: *A consolidated National Employment Programme validated by NEP National Steering Committee.* PRIOR ACTION

The Output Indicator was achieved.

---

---

Output 22 - RFL: *Productivity and Youth Employment (PYE) thematic steering committee established and functional.* PRIOR ACTION

The Output Indicator was achieved.

Output 23 - RFL: *No. of Business Development and Employment (BDE) units established and functional at district level.*

1. The Output Indicator was exceeded by 250%.
2. This Project Output was far in excess of that intended: i) 18 more BDEs, ii) 72 more staff. The current evaluation questions whether this was in response to project re-design, or to 'unplanned' factors. It also questions from which aspects of the project the funding for this over-run has been withdrawn.

Output 24 - RFL: *Gender sensitive electronic M&E system developed.* TRIGGER

The Project Output was achieved and a disbursement of funds triggered.

Output 25 - RFL: *Coordination framework of business development programmes at district level developed and approved by the Integrated Development Programme Steering Committee.* PRIOR ACTION

The Project Output was achieved.

Output 26 - RFL: *A Working Technical Secretariat for the NEP established and functional.* TRIGGER.

The Project Output was achieved and *triggered* a disbursement of funds.

Output 27 - RFL: *A consolidated database of potential youth and women entrepreneurs developed.*

1. The Project Output was achieved.
2. The current evaluation questions by what means administrators identify 'potential youth and women entrepreneurs' and once 'identified', how they respond to this information in furtherance of project objectives?

Overall Effectiveness of Outputs - Narrative Assessment:

The PCR score for overall effectiveness of Outputs is 3, 'Satisfactory'. The PCREN-R agrees.

1. Given the confusion in the figures, it is hard to see how the PCR can make any conclusions about programme Output.
  2. Even with the now improved figures, it is hard to make an overall assessment of the programme with respect to outputs due to: i) the large number of outputs (27), and ii) the very different nature of these Outputs, some being sector level administrative Outputs, some being Outputs intermediary to supplying services to the project beneficiaries, and some being Outputs directly supplying services to the project beneficiaries.
-

- 
3. While the project performed quite well overall in achieving its intended outputs, the PCR raises many questions about whether or not the outputs are ultimately relevant to the intended project beneficiaries and so whether or not they are the right outputs for achieving the over-arching objectives of the project. These are serious questions about the relevance of the project design which a PPAR should investigate and which should inform future policy formation.

e. Project development outcome:

The ratings derived for outcomes and output are combined to assess the progress the project has made towards realizing its development objectives, based on the rating methodology recommended in the Staff Guidance Note on project completion reporting and rating (see IPR Guidance Note for further instruction on development objective rating).

**The PCR score for the Development Objective (DO) Rating is 3, 'Satisfactory'. The PCREN-R agrees.**

1. The programme has made good progress towards its three component parts by enacting the measures envisaged for each component and through delivering to a good overall degree the intended outcomes of each component as detailed in the Appraisal Report section 4.2.
2. The PCR is correct in saying that, 'the impact of the reforms is yet to be realised'. However, it also raises many questions about whether the measures enacted are and will actually benefit the intended beneficiaries in the way and to the extent envisaged and whether, therefore, the programme will ultimately succeed in achieving its development objective of producing a private-sector-led transformation of the economy from a low-productivity agricultural economy to a high-productivity skills based urban economy. It may be that specific measures have to be adjusted in the light of experience, or that the whole approach has to be re-thought.

f. Beneficiaries:

Using evidence, the evaluator should provide an assessment of the relevance of the total number of beneficiaries by categories and disaggregated by sex.

In light of the substantial clarifications made to the figures above, the current evaluation provides the following alternative beneficiary list to that of the PCR. It is disaggregated by i) beneficiary category, and ii) whether it is a project outcome or output.

Beneficiaries by category, Outcome and Output.

1. Private sector companies

Outcomes

1. TVET enrolment up to 42% of upper secondary. 94,373 students (45% female).
2. % of employers satisfied with TVET up to 75%.
3. 47% of TVET graduates employed full-time after 6 months. 81% full and part-time.

Outputs

1. 12 new curricula. PSCs participated.
  2. 9 new SSCs. PSCs not enthusiastic.
  6. 12,314 PSCs hosting TVET trainees.
  7. 70,747 TVET graduates in labour market.
  9. 14,819 'unskilled' trained in labour market.
  10. 48,166 TVET trainees in industrial attachments.
  23. 30 BDE units established.
-

---

## 2. Trainees

### Outcomes

3. 47% of TVET graduates employed full-time after 6 months. 81% full and part-time.

### Outputs

1. 12 new curricula.
2. 9 new SSC's.
6. Trainees hosted in 12,314 PSC's.
7. 70,747 TVET graduates. 30,370 (43%) female.
9. 14,819 'unskilled' trained. 6,477 have toolkits
10. 48,166 TVET trainees in industrial attachments. 17,340 (36%) female.
17. 9 or 15 ICPCs completed. 3 CPCs completed. Artisans receiving training

## 3. New Entrepreneurs

### Outcomes

5. 14,781 new MSME's created annually (2015).

### Outputs

13. BDA training programme.
14. 956 BDAs trained. 379 (40%) female.
15. 832 BDAs attached to sectors. 23,674 business plans prepared.
18. 19,117 start-up MSMEs financed.
23. 30 BDE units established.
27. Database in MYICT.

## 4. Public Sector employees

### Outputs

2. 12 SSCs established and operational.
14. 956 BDAs trained. 379 (40%) female.
15. 832 BDAs attached to sectors.
22. PYE steering committee established.
23. 30 BDE units established.
24. M&E system developed in NEP.
26. Working Technical Secretariat in NEP.
27. Database in MYICT.

## g. Unanticipated additional outcomes (positive or negative, not taken into consideration in the project logical framework):

1. Neither the PCR nor the current evaluation identify any positive unintended outcomes. However, several programme Outcomes and Outputs performed well above target. The clearest example being the creation of BDEs, performing at 250% of target.
2. Neither the PCR nor the current evaluation identify any negative unintended outcomes. However, several project Outcomes and Outputs performed well below target. The particular concern here is the lack of enthusiasm shown by the private sector for a number of measures.

---

#### h. Timeliness:

The timeliness of project implementation is based on a comparison between the planned and actual period of implementation from the date of effectiveness for first disbursement.

**The PCR score for timeliness is 3, 'Satisfactory'. The PCREN agrees.**

1. There was a two month delay in disbursement of the third tranche of funds and the length of the project was extended by five months.
2. The timeliness was well orchestrated by the trigger mechanisms built into the project design.

#### i. Resource use efficiency:

Provide an assessment of physical implementation (based on outputs delivered) against resources used (based on cumulative commitments) at completion for all contributors to the project (the Bank, Government, and others).

1. N/A

#### j. Cost-benefit analysis:

Provide an assessment of the timeliness of the development outputs, and the extent to which costs of the costs have been effective and have been provided in the most efficient manner (Evaluator's Note: what does this sentence mean?). The PCR rating should be discussed. The evaluator should verify whether the benefits of the project (achieved or expected) exceed its actual costs. To achieve this, evidences will mainly be based on a comparison between Economic Rates of Return (ERR) calculated at appraisal, the mid-term review and completion. When commenting PCR ratings, the degree of utilization of valid sources for evidence justifying the rating assigned should be taken into consideration (Evaluator's Note: what does this sentence mean?). The evaluator should ensure of the validity of assumptions and that the same model was used for the calculation of others ERRs.

N/A

#### k. Implementation progress:

The assessment of the Implementation Progress (IP) on the PCR is derived from the updated IPR and takes into account the all applicable IP criteria assessed under the three categories : i) Compliance with covenants (project covenants, environmental and social safeguards and audit compliance), ii) project systems and procedures (procurement, financial management and monitoring and evaluation), and iii) project execution and financing (disbursement, budget commitments, counterpart funding and co-financing).

**The PCR score for Implementation progress is 3, 'Satisfactory'. The PCREN-R agrees.**

The programme was largely implemented as laid out in the PAR and to a good degree overall achieved its intended outcomes and outputs in the time-frame and through the mechanisms envisaged in the PAR.

## SUSTAINABILITY

#### l. Financial sustainability:

Provide an assessment of the extent to which funding mechanisms and modalities (e.g. Tariffs, user fees, maintenance fees, budgetary allocations, other stakeholder contributions, aid flows, etc.) have been put in place to ensure the continued flow of benefits after completion, with particular emphasis on financial sustainability.

**The PCR score for Financial sustainability is 3, 'Satisfactory'. The PCREN-R agrees.**

1. As the over-arching objectives of the programme are to promote inclusive growth and reduce poverty, the current evaluation notes that cost-sharing models for funding training - where a share of the cost of training is paid by the trainee - will make training *exclusive*, not *inclusive*, and will discriminate against those potential trainees without
-

---

the wealth to afford to pay for training. As such, it militates against the objectives of the programme.

2. Consequently, the relevant sources of funding for training and employment initiatives are: the GoR, employers, and development banks and agencies supporting the programme goals.
3. Clearly it is also the larger employers in the private and public sectors who are best placed to be able to subsidise training and employment initiatives, and it is those same large employers who have most to gain from doing so. It is they that should be the focus of cost-sharing funding initiatives outside of public funding, not the trainees.

**m. Institutional sustainability and strengthening of capacities:**

Provide an assessment of the extent to which the project has contributed to the strengthening of institutional capacities – including for instance through the use of country systems – that will continue to facilitate the continued flow of benefits associated with the project. An appreciation should be made with regards to whether or not improved governance practices or improved skills, procedures, incentives, structures, or institutional mechanisms came into effect as a result of the operation.

**The PCR score for Institutional sustainability is 3, ‘Satisfactory’. The PCREN-R agrees.**

1. 21 of the 27 Outputs of the programme were focussed on the strengthening of institutional capacity within the area of skills, training and employment. Building on the work of SEEP I, this lays a strong basis for continued policy development and reform in the sector.
2. The challenge for the sector – as highlighted by the PCR and the current evaluation – is to ensure that policy is *relevant to* and *valued by* the private sector, which is envisaged as the engine of transformation for the economy. The questions raised over this under SEEP II can inform on-going policy reform within the improved institutional framework.

**n. Ownership and sustainability of partnerships:**

Provide an assessment of whether the project has effectively involved relevant stakeholders, promoted a sense of ownership amongst the beneficiaries (both men and women) and put in place effective partnerships with relevant stakeholders (eg. local authorities, civil society organizations, private sector, donors) as required for the continued maintenance of the project outputs.

**The PCR score for Ownership and sustainability of partnerships is 3, ‘Satisfactory’. The PCREN-R score is 2, ‘Unsatisfactory’.**

1. The programme, under the Bank, has done much to foster ownership and sustainable partnerships with the public sector institutions in Rwanda who have been the main project stakeholders to date.
  2. However, the current evaluation sees the potential (necessity) to broaden stakeholder involvement. Particularly: i) organised student/trainee participation – the intended beneficiaries themselves, ii) any confederacies of private sector business interests that exist in Rwanda which can speak for the private sector (or sub-sectors) as a whole – again, the intended beneficiaries themselves, iii) national media, especially radio, being the most widespread media platform that can carry training and business content (but also TV and web-based media), (iv) and mobile phone networks and service providers, with mobile phones being the most prevalent communication and business tool which can carry training and business apps and bring them within the reach of the maximum number of people *for free*, and v) the private sector banks which, even if small-scale business is not part of their business model, they have a large amount of business expertise that can be leveraged for a more broad-based audience and which is in their long-term interests by encouraging growth of their potential client base.
  3. Future policy formulation and reform should address this issue.
-

---

**o. Environmental and social sustainability:**

Provide an assessment of the objectivity of the PCR rating on the project's implementation of environmental and social mitigation/enhancement measures with regard to the Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP), the capacity of country institutions and systems, as well as the availability of funding to ensure the environmental and social sustainability of the operation.

N/A

---

**4. PERFORMANCE OF STAKEHOLDERS**

---

**a. Bank performance:**

**The PCR score for Bank performance is 4, 'Highly Satisfactory'. The PCREN-R score is 3, 'Satisfactory'.**

1. The current evaluation notes that the Task Manager at completion was the same staff member as the Task Manager at approval, and also the PCR team leader. Additionally, the Regional Director and the Country Manager were also both in post at approval and completion. While this may be good for continuity of the programme, it implies that these individuals are invested heavily in the programme and so potentially raises the question of objectivity during the programme cycle and especially of the PCR. However, the PCR team are to be commended for raising many issues – especially in their narrative assessments – where the programme has encountered problems and faced shortcomings. It is these that should be the focus of on-going policy formation and reform.
2. The area of most concern in the current project is the design stage. The concern of the current evaluator is that – while the project has been strongly relevant to its *objectives* – the design has perhaps been, perhaps, too 'top-down', with the actual interests of the intended beneficiaries and key stakeholders in the project (the private sector, the trainees, youth, women) only beginning to be truly elucidated at the end of SEEP II, not at the beginning. The result – to which the PCR draws attention – is a partial mismatch of interests 'on the ground' and the difficulties now being encountered trying to get well-intentioned and implemented measures to serve the project beneficiaries and so the project objectives. These are issues which could be addressed in a full PPAR and in the design of any further projects and programmes in the sector.
3. The current evaluation finds that the skills necessary to analyse programme data and so make valid findings have not been as high as desirable. Ironically, it has in several instances led to *underestimation* of programme Outcomes and Outputs. The current evaluation has tried to compensate for these deficiencies in the time available, but it is a training issue the Bank should look at for all its project staff.
4. The Bank safeguarded the flow of funds by linking it to the achievements of *prior outputs* and *triggers*. In the one instance where the trigger was found to be un-implementable within the programme timeframe, the Bank went through the necessary steps to amend the trigger to 'the next best thing' to ensure that the programme could progress. It did so with the minimum delay in time consistent with correct Bank procedure.

**b. Borrower performance:**

**The PCR score for Borrower performance is 3, 'Satisfactory'. The PCREN-R agrees.**

1. The performance of the borrower with respect to the Administrative Measures (see section d., above) of the programme was highly satisfactory, with all but one of these measures being achieved, and that odd one being achieved in its revised form.
  2. The performance of the borrower with respect to the Pre-Beneficiary and Direct Beneficiary Measures (see section
-

---

d., above) was satisfactory for some measures but less satisfactory for others. The less satisfactory performance was largely in the borrower's dialogue and partnership relationships with the private sector. It is adjustment of this that should form the focus of on-going policy formation and reform.

c. Performance of other stakeholders:

**The PCR score for the performance of other stakeholders is 3, 'Satisfactory'. The PCREN-R agrees.**

1. The Swedish development partner performed their part in implementing the gender-sensitive electronic M&E system.
2. Private sector stakeholders (companies and individuals) negotiated their interests with the implementing institutions of the programme. These were not always aligned with the *a priori* assumptions and actions of the programme. The extent to which this proved to be a difficult negotiation is a reflection of the programme's (the Bank's, the GoR's) oversight in correctly articulating private sector interests at the inception of the programme.

---

## 5. SUMMARY OF OVERALL PROJECT PERFORMANCE

---

a. Overall assessment:

Provide a summary of the project/programme's overall performance based on the PCR 4 key components (Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency and Sustainability). Any difference with the PCR and the reasons that have resulted in them should be mentioned. For cases with insufficient evidence (from the PCR and other documents) available, the evaluator should assign a partly satisfactory rating (to be revised) until a PPAR is complete.

**The Overall Assessment score of the PCR is 3.25 - 'Satisfactory'. The PCREN-R agrees that the performance of the project is satisfactory with a slightly lower average score of 3.04.**

A brief summary of overall project performance with respect to the 4 key components of the PCR is given below:

1. **Relevance:** The evaluation finds in the programme a high degree of relevance to the stated development objectives of the GoR and to the needs of the country with respect to plugging the skills gap in the labour market. The evaluation also finds that the focus of the programme on its three component parts relating to training, business development and policy coordination, is also highly relevant to sector needs. The main questions over relevance relate to aspects of programme design, especially certain specific activities and outputs. The broad concern of the evaluation here is that some aspects of the programme design show a lack of understanding of private sector enterprise and the role of public sector policy in relationship to it, and the failure to adequately recognise, include, invest with ownership and empower the ultimate beneficiaries of the programme: students and trainees (especially youth and women), new entrepreneurs (especially youth and women) and private sector enterprises. Whether this is just an oversight of the programme, or a political judgement of the GoR, it is ultimately the judgement of the stakeholders that will determine the success or failure of the programme in reaching its development goals.
  2. **Effectiveness:** It is hard to gain a clear picture of the effectiveness of the programme in achieving its Outcome and Output targets due to deficiencies in data and data analysis, from the baseline and the RLF through to the PCR. However, progress towards targets has been made on many programme Outcomes and Outputs, especially the policy level administrative measures. As a PBO, the programme is attempting to effect measures to create a policy environment which will then lead on to achievement of the GoR's development objectives. Ultimately, the effectiveness of the programme will depend upon the response to it from its intended beneficiaries: students, youth, women, new entrepreneurs and the private sector. It is the attempt to align policy intervention with the needs of these stakeholders which should inform on-going policy formation and programme design.
-

- 
3. Efficiency: Again, deficiencies in data and data analysis with respect to Outputs makes conclusions about effectiveness difficult to draw. However, the programme was both timely and achieved a full disbursement of funds with the Bank protocols based on prior actions and triggers. Also, the programme was implemented to a large degree as laid out in the PAR without significant unexpected impacts.
  4. Sustainability: The institutional components of the programme and the learning process inherent in them make a strong base for institutional sustainability of the programme and for on-going policy reform. In the short to medium term, the evaluation sees that the financial sustainability of the programme will be reliant on further outside budgetary support, firstly in order ensure *inclusive* access to training and business services not dependent on wealth, and secondly, until such time at the economy begins solidly on the path of self-sustained growth which will produce government revenue flows to finance continued support to the sector. The evaluation sees that the sustainability and success of the programme ultimately depends on the explicit inclusion of and broadening of stakeholders and their judgement on the measures enacted within the programme.

**b. Design, implementation and utilization of the M&E (appreciation of the evaluator):**

Based on the documents reviewed, the M&E system proved equal to the task of implementing the programme on time and *towards* target, if not always *on* target. The weaknesses that can be addressed in the future were in the areas of, i) baseline data, ii) disaggregated data - especially by gender, and iii) in data analysis.

---

## **6. EVALUATION OF KEY LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

---

**a. Lessons learned:**

Provide a brief description of any agreement/disagreement with all or part of the lessons learned from the PCR after analysis of the project performance with regards to each of the key components of the evaluation (Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Sustainability). List the PCR main new and/or reformulated pertinent (and generic) lessons learned for each of these components here. It is recommended that no more than five lessons learned are discussed. Key questions and targeted audience must also be specified for each lesson learned.

1. Dialogue. VALIDATED.
  2. Approval. NOT VALIDATED. It is a recommendation. The lesson is: linking disbursement of funds to parliamentary approval can cause delays to implementation outside the control of the programme.
  3. Coordination. VALIDATED, but shortened to: There is need for a robust coordination mechanism in a multi-sectoral programme for effective monitoring, especially of the fulfillment of disbursement conditions.
  4. Women's participation. NOT VALIDATED, but reformulated to: It is important to find innovative ways to increase women's' participation in vocational training and education.
  5. Programme lending. NOT VALIDATED, but reformulated to: Programme-based operations for sectors requiring long-term investment – such as education and job creation – can be effective when aligned with sector strategies and implementation plans.
  6. Entrepreneurship. NOT VALIDATED. The 'lesson learned' is actually a recommendation. Also, the evaluation feels that these comments demonstrate a worrying lack of understanding of entrepreneurship. i) the evaluation does not believe that Rwandans are any less entrepreneurial than other sub-Saharan Africans if they are allowed to be so and especially if they are encouraged to be so, ii) it is an integral part of an entrepreneurial culture that many small businesses fail. It is the same in any free market economy in the world. Every business start-up is an experiment, most of which will fail. It is having a high number of failures that ensures enough successes to lead to
-

---

success overall. And it is in the failures that the lessons are learned which will eventually lead to success. The most entrepreneurial cultures embrace both failure and success, iii) Skills useful to budding entrepreneurs could be taught in formal education. Entrepreneurship cannot be. Entrepreneurship is ultimately a combination of the desire and determination to make money, and having the imagination and the skills to find a means of doing so. Only some of the skills can be taught.

7. Private sector. NOT VALIDATED. The ‘issue’ is actually the ‘lesson learned’: ‘Private sector involvement in skills development is vital for enhancing employability of education graduates’. Again, the stated ‘lesson learned’ demonstrates a worry lack of understanding of the Private Sector. It is not the role or the job of the Bank or the GoR or any other development partners to tell the Private Sector what would benefit it. The Private Sector always knows very well what will and what will not benefit it. If development officials wish to encourage the Private Sector, then their job is to *ask* the Private Sector what they can do to help it and then do those things (within the broader context of policy).
8. Job Creation. VALIDATED. Both the ‘issue’ and the ‘lesson learned’ are valid lessons learned. However, the current evaluation takes issue with the implication that development interventions can ‘create jobs’. The public sector can create jobs by undertaking, for example, infrastructure projects which employ many people, or opening a new ministry: both reliant on tax and other government revenues. However, it is private companies and entrepreneurs who create *sustainable* jobs by their demand for labour in the pursuit of profits. Again, it is the policy maker’s role to design and implement policy that provides a favourable environment in which they are able to do this. Only this will produce a *sustainable* flow of revenues that will pay wages to labour and taxes to the Government.
9. Monitoring. NOT VALIDATED. The lesson is: It is important to generate data disaggregated by specific target beneficiary groups, such as youth (age) and women (sex).

#### **b. Recommendations:**

Provide a brief description of any agreement/ disagreement with all or part of the recommendations from the PCR. List the PCR main new and/or reformulated recommendations (requiring more actions by the Borrower and/or the Bank) here.

1. TVET quality. VALIDATED.
  2. TVET women. VALIDATED.
  3. Coordination. VALIDATED.
  4. TVET cost. NOT VALIDATED. The means of funding the vocational training programme is a key issue. The argument against charging student fees is that it will make vocational training the *exclusive* preserve of those Rwandans able to pay those fees: it will deny the opportunity of training to those Rwandans unable to pay the fees. It *would likely* decimate enrollment rates. It would be in direct contradiction to the stated government objective of encouraging *inclusive* growth: it would *exclude* many people wanting VT and able to benefit from VT but lacking the means to pay for it. The argument for charging student fees, is that *those that can* should contribute to their own education. However, although there is an obvious private benefit that accrues to a trained individual, there is also a huge benefit – over the working life of that individual – that accrues to, a) the Government in tax revenues of income and expenditure, and ii) to the country in general in the extra productivity of that person in the labour force. It is thus in the long-term interests of the Government and the economy in general to fund vocational training. A ‘middle way’ could be means-tested fees for vocational training, although the evaluator cannot comment on the practicability of such a scheme in Rwanda.
  5. MSMEs. NOT VALIDATED. The rationale for this ‘recommendation’ is unclear to the evaluation. The most important thing for policy makers and the Government to do with respect to the success or failure of MSMEs is to find out the *generic* reasons for both success and failure, and see which – if any – of these reasons are amenable to public sector policy initiatives. If any are found to be amenable, then design and implement policy accordingly.
-

---

## 6. Skills. VALIDATED.

Certificates. NOT VALIDATED. The WDA cannot *force* private sector employers into having a certain opinion of any training certificate. If private sector employers find that the trainees with the certificates are good and productive employees, they will come to value the certificate and favour job candidates who hold the certificate over those who don't. If, however, private sector firms are not impressed by the certificate holders, then they will not value the certificate. Again, the role of the public policy maker is not to tell the private sector what it thinks, it is – in this case – to do its utmost to design and provide high quality training of which the private sector will come to hold a good opinion and will therefore value job applicants holding a certificate for that training over those who do not.

---

## 7. COMMENTS ON PCR QUALITY AND TIMELINESS

---

The PCR is satisfactory (3.22). It is fairly complete and has tried to present relevant evidence.

However, the evaluation finds that the PCR has struggled to understand most of the simple quantitative measures of project performance, making accurate assessment of project performance difficult.

Furthermore, it finds that the PCR is rather long on speculation and assertion about project performance without presenting convincing evidence to back it up: asserting what should/will/might be in the future is not evidence of project performance.

The PCR is to be commended for highlighting shortcomings in project performance, most particularly the lack of enthusiasm and lack of up-take of project measures by the private sector. These are serious shortcomings in relation to the project objectives and indicate unsuitable project design. They should be taken very seriously into account in the design of any future projects for skills, training and employment in Rwanda.

---

## 8. SUMMARY OF THE EVALUATION

---

Criteria	PCR	PCREN	Reason for disagreement/ Comments
<b>DIMENSION A: RELEVANCE</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3.5</b>	
Relevance of project development objective	4	4	
Relevance of project design	4	3	
<b>DIMENSION B: EFFECTIVENESS</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	
Development objective (DO)	3	3	
<b>DIMENSION C: EFFICIENCY</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	
Timeliness	3	3	Note that this figure is misreported in the PCR overall table as 4 which leads to an error in the average score
Resource use efficiency	N/A	N/A	
Cost-benefit analysis	N/A	N/A	
Implementation progress (IP)	3	3	
<b>DIMENSION D: SUSTAINABILITY</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2.67</b>	

Financial sustainability	3	3	
Institutional sustainability and strengthening of capacities	3	3	
Ownership and sustainability of partnerships	3	2	
Environmental and social sustainability	N/A	N/A	
<b>AVERAGE OF THE DIMENSION RATINGS</b>	<b>3.25</b>	<b>3.04</b>	For the PCR the figure is not 3.4 as reported due to the error above
<b>OVERALL PROJECT COMPLETION RATING</b>	3	3	
Bank performance:	4	3	
Borrower performance:	3	3	
Performance of other shareholders:	3	3	
<b>Overall PCR quality:</b>		3.22	

---

**9. PRIORITY FOR FUTURE EVALUATIVE WORK: PROJECT FOR PERFORMANCE EVALUATION REPORT, IMPACT EVALUATION, COUNTRY/SECTOR REVIEWS OR THEMATIC EVALUATION STUDIES:**

- Project is part of a series and suitable for cluster evaluation
- Project is a success story
- High priority for impact evaluation
- Performance evaluation is required to sector/country review
- High priority for thematic or special evaluation studies (Country)
- PPER is required because of incomplete validation rating

**Major areas of focus for future evaluation work:**

- a) Performance evaluation is required for sector/ country review
- b) Cluster evaluation (institutional support)
- c) Sector evaluation (budgetary support or public finance management reforms)

**Follow up action by IDEV:**

Identify same cluster or sector operations; organize appropriate work or consultation mission to facilitate a), b) and/or c).

**Division Manager clearance**

**Director signing off**

---

**Data source for validation:**

- Task Manager/ Responsible bank staff interviewed/contacted (in person, by telephone or email)
- Documents/ Database reports

**Attachment:**

- PCR evaluation note validation sheet of performance ratings
- List of references

## PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT EVALUATION NOTE

### Validation of PCR performance ratings

PCR rating scale:

Score	Description
4	<b>Very Good</b> – Fully achieved with no shortcomings
3	<b>Good</b> – Mostly achieved despite a few shortcomings
2	<b>Fair</b> – Partially achieved. Shortcomings and achievements are roughly balanced
1	<b>Poor</b> – very limited achievement with extensive shortcomings
UTS	Unable to score/rate
NA	Non Applicable

Criteria	Sub-criteria	PCR work score	IDEV review	Reasons for deviation/comments
RELEVANCE	Relevance of the project development objective (DO) during implementation	4	4	The current evaluation agrees with the PCR score of 4. The project remained relevant to the stated policies of the GoR, the AfDB and the IMF for Rwanda.
	Relevance of project design (from approval to completion)	4	3	The current evaluation disagrees with the PCR score of 4 - based mainly on evidence provided in the PCR itself – and gives a lower score of 3.
<b>OVERALL RELEVANCE SCORE</b>		<b>4</b>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>The PCREN score is lower than the PCR score due to questions over programme design.</b>
EFFECTIVE NESS*	<b>Effectiveness in delivering outcomes</b>			
	<b>Outcome 1</b> <i>RFL: Share of TVET enrolment as % of upper secondary stream.</i>		2	
	<b>Outcome 2</b> <i>RFL: % of employers who are satisfied with the TVET graduates.</i>		3	
	<b>Outcome 3</b> <i>RFL: % of TVET graduates employed six months after graduation (disaggregated by sex)</i>		4	
	<b>Outcome 4</b> <i>RFL: Share of independent off-farm employment in total employment.</i>		1	

Criteria	Sub-criteria	PCR work score	IDEV review	Reasons for deviation/comments
	<b>Outcome 5</b> <i>RFL: No. of MSME's created annually as start-ups.</i>		4	
	<b>OVERALL OUTCOMES</b>	3	3	The PCREN agrees with the score of the PCR based on the figures and calculations above and not on the figures presented in the PCR.
<b>Effectiveness in delivering outputs</b>				
	<b>Output 1</b> <i>RFL: No. of TVET curricula designed in collaboration with private sector.</i>		4	
	<b>Output 2</b> <i>RFL: No. of sector skills councils (SSCs) established (and operational)</i>		3	
	<b>Output 3</b> <i>RFL: Legal framework, procedure guidelines and action plan for SSCs developed. TRIGGER</i>		4	
	<b>Output 4</b> <i>RFL: Strategy to promote private sector provision of professional internship and industrial attachment approved by NCBS National Steering Committee.</i>		4	
	<b>Output 5</b> <i>RFL: Assessment on Professional Internship Programme completed and validated by RDB senior management. PRIOR ACTION</i>		3	
	<b>Output 6</b> <i>RFL: No. of private sector enterprises hosting TVET trainees (companies and cooperatives).</i>		4	
	<b>Output 7</b> <i>RFL: No. of TVET graduates (including TSS, VTC, IPRC) (% female)</i>		4	
	<b>Output 8</b> <i>RFL: National Apprenticeship Policy developed and approved by Cabinet. TRIGGER</i>		3	

Criteria	Sub-criteria	PCR work score	IDEV review	Reasons for deviation/comments
	<b>Output 9</b> <i>RFL: No. of unskilled and semi-skilled people trained, certified, and getting toolkits (disaggregated by sex).</i>		3	
	<b>Output 10</b> <i>RFL: No. of TVET trainees enrolled in industrial attachment programs (disaggregated by sex).</i>		4	
	<b>Output 11</b> <i>RFL: TVET Policy and Strategy approved by Cabinet.</i> TRIGGER		4	
	<b>Output 12</b> <i>RFL: Law establishing WDA revised and enacted by Parliament.</i> TRIGGER		3	
	<b>Output 13</b> <i>RFL: Certification Programme for BDA's established and implemented.</i> TRIGGER		4	
	<b>Output 14</b> <i>RFL: No. of business advisors trained and certified at level 1 and 2 (disaggregated by sex)</i>		3	
	<b>Output 15</b> <i>RFL: No. of BDSs attached to sectors (umurenge).</i>		3	
	<b>Output 16</b> <i>RFL: Assessment on the impact of local tax fixing and administration on MSMEs.</i>		2	
	<b>Output 17</b> <i>RFL: No. of ICPCs and CPC's equipped and operational.</i>		2	
	<b>Output 18</b> <i>RFL: No. of start-up MSMEs for youth and women accessed to finance.</i>		2	
	<b>Output 19</b> <i>RFL: Study report on women skills gap and existing opportunities in all districts completed and validated by the Permanent Secretary (MIGEPROF).</i> TRIGGER.		4	

Criteria	Sub-criteria	PCR work score	IDEV review	Reasons for deviation/comments
	<b>Output 20</b> <i>RFL: Guidelines on provision of seed start-up capital for youth and women developed.</i>		3	
	<b>Output 21</b> <i>RFL: A consolidated National Employment Programme validated by NEP National Steering Committee. PRIOR ACTION</i>		4	
	<b>Output 22</b> <i>RFL: Productivity and Youth Employment (PYE) thematic steering committee established and functional. PRIOR ACTION</i>		4	
	<b>Output 23</b> <i>RFL: No. of Business Development and Employment (BDE) units established and functional at district level.</i>		3	
	<b>Output 24</b> <i>RFL: Gender sensitive electronic M&amp;E system developed. TRIGGER</i>		4	
	<b>Output 25</b> <i>RFL: Coordination framework of business development programmes at district level developed and approved by the Integrated Development Programme Steering Committee. PRIOR ACTION</i>		4	
	<b>Output 26</b> <i>RFL: A Working Technical Secretariat for the NEP established and functional. TRIGGER.</i>		4	
	<b>Output 27</b> <i>RFL: A consolidated database of potential youth and women entrepreneurs developed.</i>		4	
	<b>OVERALL OUTPUTS</b>	3	3	The PCREN agrees with the score of the PCR based on the figures and calculations above and not on the figures presented in the PCR.
<b>Development objective (DO)</b>				
	Development objective rating	3	3	The PCREN agrees with the score of the PCR, and also with the serious questions raised by the PCR about the relevance of some program measures to the workforce and the private sector in the light of

Criteria	Sub-criteria	PCR work score	IDEV review	Reasons for deviation/comments
				experience.
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				
	Beneficiary1	N/A	UTS	
	Beneficiary2	N/A	UTS	
<b>Unanticipated outcomes (positive or negative not considered in the project logical framework) and their level of impact on the project (high, moderate, low)</b>				
	Institutional development	N/A	UTS	
	Gender	N/A	UTS	
	Environment & climate change	N/A	UTS	
	Poverty reduction	N/A	UTS	
	Private sector development	N/A	UTS	
	Regional integration	N/A	UTS	
	Other (specify)	N/A	UTS	
<b>EFFECTIVENESS OVERALL SCORE</b>				
EFFICIENCY	Timeliness (based on the initial closing date)	3	3	
	Resource used efficiency	N/A	N/A	
	Cost-benefit analysis	N/A	N/A	
	Implementation progress (from the IPR)	3	3	
	Other (specify)	N/A	N/A	
<b>OVERALL EFFICIENCY SCORE</b>		<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	
SUSTAINABILITY	Financial sustainability	3	3	
	Institutional sustainability and strengthening of capacities	3	3	
	Ownership and sustainability of partnerships	3	3	
	Environmental and social sustainability	N/A	N/A	
<p>*The rating of the effectiveness component is obtained from the development objective (DO) rating in the latest IPR of the project (see Guidance Note on the IPR).</p> <p>The ratings for outputs and outcomes are determined based on the project's progress towards realizing its targets, and the overall development objective of the project (DO) is obtained by combining the ratings obtained for outputs and outcomes</p>				

Criteria	Sub-criteria	PCR work score	IDEV review	Reasons for deviation/comments
following the method defined in the IPR Guidance Note. The following method is applied: Highly satisfactory (4), Satisfactory (3), Unsatisfactory (2) and Highly unsatisfactory (1).				

Criteria	Sub-criteria	PCR Work score	IDEV review	Reasons for deviation/comments
BANK PERFORMANCE	Proactive identification and resolution of problems at different stage of the project cycle	N/A	4	
	Use of previous lessons learned from previous operations during design and implementation	N/A	3	
	Promotion of stakeholder participation to strengthen ownership	N/A	2	Insufficient promotion of stakeholder participation outside of public sector institutions.
	Enforcement of safeguard and fiduciary requirements	N/A	3	
	Design and implementation of Monitoring & Evaluation system	N/A	UTS	
	Quality of Bank supervision (mix of skills in supervisory teams, etc.)	N/A	UTS	
	Timeliness of responses to requests	N/A	3	Only one disbursement slightly late.
<b>OVERALL BANK PERFORMANCE SCORE</b>		<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	
BORROWER PERFORMANCE	Quality of preparation and implementation	N/A	3	
	Compliance with covenants, agreements and safeguards	N/A	UTS	
	Provision of timely counterpart funding	N/A	N/A	
	Responsiveness to supervision recommendations	N/A	3	
	Measures taken to establish basis for project sustainability	N/A	2	
	Timeliness of preparing requests	N/A	4	
<b>OVERALL BORROWER PERFORMANCE SCORE</b>		<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	
PERFORMANCE OF OTHER STAKEHOLDERS	Timeliness of disbursements by co-financiers	N/A	N/A	
	Functioning of collaborative agreements	N/A	3	
	Quality of policy dialogue with co-financiers (for PBOs only)	N/A	N/A	
	Quality of work by service providers	N/A	UTS	
	Responsiveness to client demands	N/A	UTS	
<b>OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF OTHER STAKEHOLDERS</b>		<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	

The overall rating is given: Very Good, Good, Fair and Poor.

- (i) Very Good (HS) : 4
- (ii) Good (H) : 3
- (iii) Fair (US) : 2
- (iv) Poor (HUS): 1

### **DESIGN, IMPLEMENTAION AND UTILIZATION OF MONITIRING AND EVALUATION (M&E)**

Criteria	Sub-criteria	IDEV Score	Comments
M&E DESIGN	M&E system is in place, clear, appropriate and realistic	UTS	
	Monitoring indicators and monitoring plan were duly approved	UTS	
	Existence of disaggregated gender indicator	2	Some disaggregation. Some missing.
	Baseline data were available or collected during the design	2	Some Baseline data. Some missing.
	Other, specify	N/A	N/A
<b>OVERALL M&amp;E DESIGN SCORE</b>		<b>UTS</b>	
M&E IMPLEMENTA-TION	The M&E function is adequately equipped and staffed	UTS	
<b>OVERALL M&amp;E IMPLEMENTATION SCORE</b>			
M&E UTILIZATION	The borrower used the tracking information for decision	UTS	
<b>OVERALL M&amp;E UTILIZATION SCORE</b>			
<b>OVERALL M&amp;E PERFORMANCE SCORE</b>		<b>UTS</b>	

## PCR QUALITY EVALUATION

Criteria	PCR-EVN (1-4)	Comments
<b>QUALITY OF PCR</b>		
1. Extent of quality and completeness of the PCR evidence and analysis to substantiate the ratings of the various sections	3	Weaknesses in data and analysis make accurate conclusions difficult.
2. Extent of objectivity of PCR assessment score	4	Largely realistic (although see above).
3. Extent of internal consistency of PCR assessment ratings; inaccuracies; inconsistencies; (in various sections; between text and ratings; consistency of overall rating with individual component ratings)	4	Largely consistent.
4. Extent of identification and assessment of key factors (internal and exogenous) and unintended effects (positive or negative) affecting design and implementation	3	Many factors are identified but not clearly understood. The key weakness is the lack of a clear understanding of the private sector and how public sector policy should relate to it in pursuit of stated national development goals.
5. Adequacy of treatment of safeguards, fiduciary issues, and alignment and harmonization	4	
6. Extent of soundness of data generating and analysis process (including rates of returns) in support of PCR assessment	2	Weaknesses in data (baseline, disaggregated, consistency) and its analysis and interpretation.
7. Overall adequacy of the accessible evidence (from PCR including annexure and other data provided)	3	The PCR presented much evidence, but didn't always clearly understand its implications.
8. Extent to which lessons learned (and recommendations) are clear and based on the PCR assessment (evidence & analysis)	3	Some valid lessons learned and recommendations, but again the weakness is in understanding the private sector and the role of public sector policy in regards to it.
9. Extent of overall clarity and completeness of the PCR	3	Fairly clear and complete overall, but weaknesses in interpretation.
Other (specify)		
PCR QUALITY SCORE	3.22	A conscientious effort, but must look hard at some aspects of the relevance of programme design to development objectives.
PCR compliance with guidelines (PCR/OM ; IDEV)		
1. PCR Timeliness (On time = 4; Late= 1)	4	
2. Extent of participation of borrower, Co-financiers & field offices in PCR preparation	UTS	
3. Other aspect(s) (specify)		
PCR COMPLIANCE SCORE	3	
*** rated as Very Good (4), or Good (3), or Fair (2), or Poor (1)		

## References

25 Oct 2011	Country Strategy Paper (CSP)
April 2014	Project Appraisal Report (PAR)
May 2014	Technical Annexes to PAR
7 May 2014	Loan Agreement
5 June 2014	CSP Mid-Term Review (MTR)
4 Dec 2014	Implementation Progress Report (IPR)
25 June 2015	IPR
22 Dec 2015	IPR
24 Aug 2016	CSP Completion Report
25 July 2016	Project Completion Report (PCR)

## List of Acronyms

AfDB	African Development Bank
AM	Administrative Measure
BDA	Business Development Advisor
BDE	Business Development and Employment Unit
CPC	Community Processing Centre
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
DBM	Direct Beneficiary Measure
EDPRS	Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy
FI	Financial Institution
GoR	Government of Rwanda
ICPC	Integrated Craft Production Centre
IDP	Integrated Development Programme
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MSME	Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise
MYICT	Ministry of Youth, Information, Communication and Technology
NCBS	National Capacity Building Secretariat
NEP	National Employment Programme
NFP	Not-For-Profit organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSC	National Steering Committee
PAR	Project Appraisal Report
PBM	Pre-Beneficiary Measure
PBO	Policy Based Operation
PCR	Project Completion Report
PS	Private Secretary
PYE	Productivity and Youth Employment
RDB	Rwanda Development Board
RLF	Results-based Logical Framework
SC	Steering Committee
SEEP	Skills, Employability and Entrepreneurship Programme
SSC	Sector Skills Council
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UA	Unit of Account
VT	Vocational Training
WDA	Workforce Development Authority